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Introduction and Summary
The U.S. unemployment insurance (UI) system is unique in the 
world in that it is financed by an experience-rated payroll tax. This 
means that individual firms pay higher or lower UI taxes depending on 
whether they cause more or less unemployment and unemployment 
benefit payments. Experience rating internalizes the costs of unem 
ployment to individual firms, thereby inducing them to stabilize 
employment patterns. Hence, experience rating may lead to a reduction 
in layoffs and in unemployment.
Since the inception of the federal-state UI system in the mid-1930s, 
the experience-rating provisions have been vigorously debated among 
politicians, trade unionists, business people, and academic economists. 
The last comprehensive treatment of all aspects of experience rating 
was undertaken by Joseph M. Becker, whose seminal book on this 
topic was published in 1972. His views were restated, with minor mod 
ifications, in his 1981 monograph. Becker©s work was followed by the 
contributions of Feldstein (1976), Brechling (1977), and Baily (1978). 
The early literature was surveyed by Hamermesh (1977, 1978), Gust- 
man (1982), and Topel and Welch (1980).
The Need for Research
In the research underlying this book, we have reexamined the role of 
experience rating in the UI system. Such a reconsideration is needed 
because of recent changes in labor market conditions, including the 
growth in permanent employment reductions due to major downsizing 
by some large employers, increased numbers of plant closures, and 
bankruptcies. Large structural shifts in economic activity and employ 
ment took place in the 1980s, and they are likely to continue. Thus, the 
question arises as to whether the present UI system and, in particular, 
its experience-rating provisions are capable of coping adequately with 
the consequences of the substantial reallocation of labor. Our research
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is aimed at providing some answers to this important economic and 
political question.
Current systems of experience rating seem to be well designed to 
allocate the costs of unemployment caused by temporary, easily pre 
dictable, and recurrent layoffs. Such layoffs do not lead to significant 
permanent employment changes. There are valid arguments for allocat 
ing the costs of temporary layoffs to the firms that caused them. Fur 
ther, in most states, it seems that the existing experience-rating systems 
can be modified to allocate these costs to the appropriate firms.
Most theoretical and empirical investigations of the UI system have 
been based on models of temporary layoffs. For instance, the influen 
tial article by Feldstein (1976) and later contributions by Wolcowitz 
(1984) and Cook (1992), all employ an approach, similar to that of 
early implicit contract theories, in which employees have a lasting 
attachment to a particular firm, but are laid off periodically and later 
recalled in a fairly predictable manner. In these models, UI benefits are 
a means of raising workers© incomes during periods of temporary 
unemployment, and, so the argument goes, these benefits ought to be 
regarded as part of the firm©s labor costs. If, by contrast, UI benefits 
were financed by a general payroll (or other) tax not based on an expe 
rience rating, there might be more layoffs, and high-layoff firms would 
receive a permanent subsidy from low-layoff firms. As a result, high- 
layoff activities would be expanded. Experience rating clearly leads to 
increased efficiency and social well-being, at least from a long-run per 
spective.
In much of the UI research, experience rating is modeled in a fairly 
abstract manner. For example, following Feldstein©s original contribu 
tion, many researchers have described experience rating simply by the 
ratio of total benefits charged to the tax payments of employers. The 
reserve ratio method of experience rating, which is the most commonly 
used approach, has been modeled by Brechling (1977) and, more 
recently, by Wolcowitz (1984) and Cook (1992). Cook has extended 
the work to the benefit ratio method, the other important technique of 
experience rating. Both approaches imply that experience rating is 
imperfect in the sense that (1) there are substantial lags between the 
payments of benefits to workers and the corresponding receipt of UI 
taxes, and (2) there are maximum and minimum tax rates that curtail or 
even suspend the relationship between benefits and taxes. Although
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these features of the UI tax systems have been modeled in an insightful 
manner by both Wolcowitz and Cook, neither examines the effects of 
permanent employment reductions.
Suppose now that a substantial proportion of total layoffs is perma 
nent, necessitated by some structural development, such as changes in 
tastes, new technologies, or competition from imports. Some plants 
may have to close completely, some may go into bankruptcy, and oth 
ers may experience substantial downsizing. In any case, employment 
in the industry must contract substantially. From a social point of view, 
who should bear the unemployment costs of these layoffs? Is experi 
ence rating a desirable property of the UI system? Do present experi 
ence-rating methods allocate these costs appropriately? These types of 
questions have not been considered in the previous literature on experi 
ence rating. Consequently, we have addressed these issues in our 
research for this book.
Study Results
Our work has produced a number of findings. First, permanent 
employment reductions amount to about 70 percent of total employ 
ment reductions. While employment reductions are not necessarily the 
same as layoffs, our evidence, using UI data for Texas for 1978-89, 
together with some previous results, indicates that permanent layoffs 
are a significant proportion of total layoffs. Thus, our analysis of expe 
rience rating in the context of permanent layoffs seems justified.
Second, based on our theoretical model, the socially optimal rate of 
moving labor from contracting to expanding sectors can be achieved 
only when the transfer costs are borne either by the laid-off employee 
or by the employer in the contracting industry. The agent who pays for 
the transfer costs must also control the rate of transfer of labor.
Wages and prices adjust to different payment mechanisms to bring 
about the same socially optimal rate of labor transfer. Even if wages 
are not fully flexible, the socially optimal rate of transfer may still be 
achieved by charging the costs to the employer in the contracting sec 
tor. Furthermore, under the current system, laid-off workers are paid 
UI benefits on the condition that they actively search for alternative
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employment. Although this requirement is enforced with varying vigor 
in the states, it is designed to ensure that workers are, indeed, trans 
ferred to the expanding sectors at a socially optimal rate.
When the agent who pays for the adjustment costs does not control 
the rate of layoffs or hiring, there tends to be a large, nonoptimal 
adjustment of labor, or high structural unemployment. Since the gov 
ernment is usually not able to control the rate of transfer of labor, pay 
ment of the adjustment costs by the government (financed, for 
example, from general revenues) is nonoptimal. It may be argued that 
government financing is justified, to the extent that markets bring about 
too slow an adjustment. However, we conclude that, in general, experi 
ence rating (charging the costs of unemployment back to the contract 
ing employers) generates socially beneficial results. This conclusion 
reinforces the finding that, with only temporary layoffs, increases in 
the degree of experience rating tend to lead to improvements in the 
allocation of resources.
Third, when layoffs are permanent, payroll taxes are not an ideal 
way of implementing experience rating. Temporary layoffs leave the 
taxable payroll (that is, the tax base) more or less unchanged, while 
permanent layoffs reduce the taxable payroll. Suppose, for example, 
that a firm©s layoffs increase and that the UI benefits received by the 
laid-off workers are charged to the firm©s account. If the layoffs are 
temporary, the taxable payroll remains more or less constant, and tax 
payments increase after a lag. If, by contrast, the layoffs are permanent, 
the taxable payroll and, hence, the firm©s tax payments fall immedi 
ately. After a lag, the firm©s tax rate and tax payments may rise to reim 
burse partially the UI system. In the limiting case, when the firm goes 
out of business, its taxable payroll and tax liabilities fall to zero. Thus, 
the charged benefits can never be recovered.
Our analysis shows that, under both systems of experience rating, 
UI tax liabilities are less than the benefit costs of permanent layoffs. In 
particular, when the firm is and remains at the maximum or minimum 
tax rate, it receives a tax reward for laying off workers permanently. 
This is the very opposite result to that intended by experience rating.
When the firm©s long-run position is on the experience-rated portion 
of the tax schedule and the maximum tax rate applies only temporarily, 
then the reserve ratio method of experience rating, because of its 
longer memory, tends to generate a higher ratio of taxes to benefit costs
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than is true with the benefit ratio method. In other words, the reserve 
ratio method tends to internalize a higher proportion of benefit costs 
than is true with the benefit ratio method.
We conclude this book with suggested economic policy changes. 
These recommendations are designed to increase the degree of experi 
ence rating and the degree of internalization of the costs of unemploy 
ment. Some of our policy suggestions have been made before: 
increasing or abolishing the maximum and minimum tax rates and 
shortening the lag between benefit charges and tax increases would 
improve the performance of the systems.
Our relatively new policy suggestions refer to the reserve ratio 
method of experience rating. First, positive balances in the UI trust 
fund should be treated as part of the employer©s assets, and negative 
balances should be considered as liabilities. Second, upon bankruptcy, 
the firm©s positive or negative balance in the UI trust fund should be 
counted as part of business assets or liabilities. Moreover, the UI trust 
fund ought to be allowed to claim reimbursement for part or all of the 
firm©s UI liabilities in bankruptcy proceedings. Third, interest should 
be paid to the firm on its positive balances and charged on its negative 
balances. Together with the abolition of the maximum and minimum 
tax rates, these provisions could ensure the complete internalization of 
the costs of permanent as well as of temporary layoffs.
Much of the analysis underlying this study is abstract and mathe 
matical. In our exposition we have attempted to present the arguments 
and principal findings first in intuitive terms and then more formally. 
We hope that this structure, which inevitably leads to some duplication, 
makes the research meaningful to a larger readership than would be the 
case with a tight mathematical presentation.

Principles of Insurance and the
Current Structure of U.S. 
Unemployment Insurance Financing
In this chapter, we sketch the background to the central analysis pre 
sented in the remainder of the book. First, we discuss briefly the major 
principles of insurance and the manner in which experience rating 
operates. Second, systems of unemployment insurance (UI) without 
and with experience rating are outlined and analyzed. Third, the two 
chief experience-rating methods currently used in the U.S. are 
described. We then briefly review some of the relevant recent theoreti 
cal literature on experience rating.
Some Basic Principles of Insurance
Insurance is a contract in which an individual pays premiums to an 
insurer, who promises to compensate the insurant for a loss caused by 
some unpredictable circumstance covered by the agreement. Thus, 
insurance is a hedge against the costs of uncertain events. Risk aver 
sion on the part of the insurant and the ability of the insurer to pool 
risks make insurance possible, likely, and generally efficient from an 
economic perspective.
Insurance may, however, entail some inefficiencies. Most notably, 
the so-called moral hazard problem arises when the insurant has some 
control over the insured event. For example, an insured business owner 
facing bankruptcy might hire an arsonist; if the owner could easily 
arrange for the burning of the business, insurers would be unwilling to 
provide insurance. Thus, for private insurance markets to exist, the 
insurer must be able to control moral hazard at a low cost.
In well-functioning insurance markets, the price of insurance, 
namely, the premium, is set at a level such that the present value of the 
stream of the insurant©s premiums is just equal to the expected present
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value of the individual©s insurance claims plus the cost of administer 
ing the contract, all measured over an appropriately long period of 
time. Insurants with similar risks of loss are grouped together into a 
risk class and are charged the same insurance premium. Thus, within a 
risk class, insurance claims and premiums tend to offset one another, 
both over time and across different insurants. In other words, risks are 
pooled both over time and among different members of the same risk 
class. As a consequence, over an appropriate span of time, the mem 
bers of the risk class finance their own claims, producing neither a sur 
plus nor a deficit. In any particular year, any member of the risk class 
may, of course, have a deficit or a surplus with the pool.
It follows that an insurant©s weekly, monthly, or annual insurance 
premiums will differ according to the risk class to which that individ 
ual is assigned. For example, teenagers pay higher automobile insur 
ance premiums than do adults, house insurance is more expensive for 
dwellings located near frequent mud slides or in a hurricane area, life 
insurance is more expensive for people with severe medical conditions, 
and so on.
In some types of insurance, in which the insured event occurs 
repeatedly, the insurant may be reassigned periodically to a different 
risk class, depending on the person©s prior claims experience. This pro 
cedure is called experience rating, and it is particularly helpful when 
the factors, such as age, sex, and marital status, are not very accurate 
predictors of the insurant©s risk class. Thus, if an insurant©s claims 
were very low over a period of years, the individual may be assigned to 
a lower risk class with a decreased premium. In effect, the experience 
rating establishes a link between past insurance claims and the current 
insurance premium. Perhaps the best known example of experience rat 
ing occurs in automobile insurance in the form of "good driver dis 
counts." Experience rating may also be effected through a special levy, 
such as deductibles or copayments, when an insurance claim is paid.
Two related aspects of experience rating are of special interest. First, 
experience rating implies incentives for the insurant to reduce claims 
by either controlling the uncertain events or by not submitting claims. 
Experience rating in automobile insurance may induce insurants to 
drive more carefully and/or to pay for minor accidental damage out of 
their own pockets, so as not to lose the "no claims bonus." In this way,
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experience rating tends to reduce the various forms of moral hazard in 
insurance.
Second, experience rating implies that there is participation by the 
insurant in the insurance against the occurrence of the uncertain event. 
This is the coinsurance aspect of experience rating. The extent of this 
participation depends upon the degree of experience rating. As the 
degree of experience rating increases, the insurant©s premium (or 
copayment) corresponds more and more closely to his/her recent 
claims experience, so that the insurant pays more of the bill out-of- 
pocket.
Suppose, for instance, that the insurant has a claim for $5,000 and 
that consequently this individual©s premium either shows no change or 
rises immediately by $500 or $5,000. If the premium does not increase, 
there is no experience rating. If it rises by $500, there is some degree of 
experience rating. If it rises by $5,000, experience rating is extreme in 
that the insurant suffers the entire loss. Since the total insurance pre 
mium includes a charge for administrative expenses, the insurant will 
reject contracts with such severe experience rating conditions: they 
impose costs (the $5,000 plus administrative fees) yet offer no insur 
ance protection.
Experience rating appears to be particularly effective in discourag 
ing relatively small and frequent claims against which insurants are 
quite willing to self-insure. Further, since these types of claims tend to 
have especially high administrative costs, their elimination is likely to 
reduce average insurance premiums.
Experience Rating in Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides a valuable service. If work 
ers are risk averse because, while unemployed, they cannot borrow 
against the expectations of future earnings, then they are likely to be 
willing to pay a premium (possibly in the form of reduced wages) for 
insurance that mitigates the effects of income fluctuations. These indi 
viduals are willing to exchange an uncertain, fluctuating income stream 
for a certain and constant one with a smaller expected present value
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(see Baily 1977, 1978; Stafford 1977; Topel and Welch 1980; Rosen 
1983; and Burtless 1990).
In spite of the persuasive arguments for this insurance, private UI 
markets have been very limited. Many reasons for this apparent market 
failure have been adduced. For instance, Rosen (1977) and Topel and 
Welch (1980) ascribe the deficiency to the high concentration of claims 
during recessions, which inhibits risk pooling among workers. What 
ever the reason, all industrialized societies have seen fit to introduce 
public UI systems. In general, these systems are financed out of gen 
eral government revenue or by a uniform payroll tax. Only rarely are 
taxes imposed on the individual insurants, namely, the workers.
As stated earlier, the UI system in the United States is unique in that 
it is financed by a payroll tax assessed on and experience rated for indi 
vidual employers. Thus, employers owe higher taxes when the unem 
ployment benefits paid to their laid-off employees are larger. Details of 
the two most common methods of experience rating are presented later 
in this chapter.
Simple Analytical Model of Unemployment Insurance
To illustrate the major consequences of experience rating in unem 
ployment insurance, we postulate a simple model that preserves the 
essential elements of the various arguments. Assume that there are two 
competitive industries, which are identical in all relevant respects 
except that one is stable and one is unstable. The stable industry faces a 
nonfluctuating demand, whereas the unstable industry is subject to 
recurrent demand swings that may be fairly regular (cyclical or sea 
sonal) or random. Further, within the unstable industry, the demand 
fluctuations are distributed randomly across individual employers. In 
the short run, those employers are not affected identically by the vari 
ability in industry demand, but over a suitably long period of time, all 
employers in the unstable industry experience the same average fluctu 
ations. Employers have the ability to mitigate the impact of swings in 
demand upon layoffs by means of production smoothing and similar 
techniques, which have marginal costs. Employers balance these costs 
against the costs of layoffs and rehires and thus determine their optimal 
layoff rates.
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We assume that the total labor supply for the entire economy is not 
responsive to wage changes (that is, it is perfectly inelastic), although 
workers can move between the two industries. All workers are assumed 
to be homogeneous in the relevant characteristics, and, in particular, to 
have identical degrees of risk aversion. Movements of workers 
between industries are sufficiently responsive so that, in the long run, 
the net compensation of employees is equalized in the two sectors. 
Layoffs are effected by employers, without influence by workers and 
are distributed randomly across employees. Workers may have the abil 
ity to control the duration of unemployment, however, by accepting or 
rejecting new job offers. All of these assumptions can be relaxed with 
out affecting the essential results of the following arguments.
We analyze this simple model under four different sets of circum 
stances. First, there is no formal UI system, so that employees must 
self-insure. This means that workers in the unstable industry must pro 
vide for their own income maintenance during periods of unemploy 
ment, by saving and/or borrowing. Second, there is private UI financed 
by premiums charged to individual workers. Third, there is public UI 
financed by a uniform employer tax. Fourth, there is public UI financed 
by an experience-rated tax. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
all UI programs are complete, in the sense that they smooth out com 
pletely the income fluctuations caused by layoffs.
Self-Insurance by Employees
In the absence of any type of UI program, a reasonably well-func 
tioning labor market would generate, at least in the long run, higher 
average earnings in the unstable industry than in the stable one. The 
absence of earnings during layoffs would be more than offset by high 
earnings during periods of employment: the average annual earnings in 
the unstable industry would have to compensate risk-averse employees 
for the cost and trouble to self-insure against the consequences of lay 
offs. Competition in the labor market would maintain this earnings dif 
ferential.
Workers in the unstable industry would have an incentive to control 
their unemployment duration by accepting any alternative job offers 
leading to an increase in earnings. Similarly, employers in the unstable 
industry would have an incentive to control layoffs; if they could 
reduce layoffs at a sufficiently low marginal cost, they would be able to
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attract workers from the stable industry at lower annual earnings. Lay 
off rates, unemployment duration, and earnings would be optimal, 
given that risk-averse workers must self-insure against fluctuating 
income, in the sense that all agents optimize by equating the appropri 
ate marginal costs and benefits.
The allocation of resources between the stable and unstable indus 
tries would also tend to be optimal in that the appropriate weight is 
given to instability and because workers must self-insure. Any exoge 
nous reduction in the degree of volatility would lead to an expansion of 
the unstable industry relative to the other sector.
For comparison with the cases described in the following sections, 
let us suppose that the smoothly distributed annual earnings in the sta 
ble industry are $25,000, while the fluctuating earnings in the unstable 
industry are $26,000. The difference of $1,000 represents the cost of 
self-insurance.
Private Unemployment Insurance
Consider now that there is a private UI program, which can offer a 
constant annual income stream to workers in the unstable industry at a 
uniform price per employee that is less than the cost of self-insurance. 
An insurance company might be able to offer such a relatively cheap 
contract by pooling the risk of income loss both across individual 
workers and over time. In practice, the insurance company would have 
to charge premiums that might be substantial during periods of 
employment and then return most, but not all, of them as benefits dur 
ing periods of unemployment. The administrative costs, as well as nor 
mal profits for insurance provision, are covered by the difference 
between total premiums and total benefit payments. Accordingly, we 
define two income concepts for employees in the unstable industry: 
gross income is the total average annual income received from the 
employer, while net or disposable income is the gross income plus total 
benefits received minus total premiums paid. Movement by workers 
between the two industries ensures that the net income in the unstable 
industry equals the gross income (which is identical to net income) in 
the stable industry.
In comparison with the case of workers© self-insurance, relative 
labor costs have fallen in the unstable industry, so that there will be a 
tendency for it to expand. In other words, since risk pooling through
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insurance has removed part of the undesirable effects of instability, the 
activity in the unstable industry is likely to expand at the expense of the 
other.
The introduction of private insurance has given rise to two possible 
moral hazard problems. First, since the insurance companies pay the 
full salary as long as individuals remain unemployed, workers have no 
incentive to accept any new job if they value the leisure time afforded 
by being unemployed. This "free rider" situation may be avoided par 
tially by proper policing of the insurance contract or by increasing 
worker participation in the insurance. Clearly, increases in such partic 
ipation may be obtained through experience rating of individual work 
ers or through benefit payments that decline with the duration of 
unemployment.
The second type of moral hazard arises from the behavior of 
employers. Employers have no incentive to increase the degree of 
employment smoothing because all employees already enjoy even 
incomes. Hence, personnel would not be prepared to give up income 
for employment stability. Some degree of worker participation in the 
insurance may, again, remove part of this moral hazard.
In terms of the previous numerical example, assume that the private 
insurance industry can offer insurance at a price of $500 a year. A pos 
sible long-run equilibrium may then be established by an annual aver 
age (gross and net) income of $25,300 in the stable industry and a 
gross average income of $25,800 in the unstable industry, of which 
workers pay $500 to insurance companies and retain $25,300 as net 
average annual income.
Public Insurance with a Uniform Tax on Employers
We now assume that, in lieu of the private insurance of the last sec 
tion, a public UI system is introduced, which is financed by a uniform 
tax imposed on all employers in both industries. For simplicity, as 
before, we assume that, due to the UI program, all workers in the 
unstable industry receive a constant flow of disposable income, includ 
ing the unemployment benefits when on layoff. Hence, there is no need 
for self-insurance, and competition equalizes disposable incomes in the 
two industries.
Suppose that the uniform employer tax is a payroll tax that raises 
labor costs in both industries by a proportionately equal amount. In
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comparison with the case of workers© self-insurance, this increase in 
labor costs is offset to some degree by the disappearance of the risk 
premium on earnings in the unstable industry, while there is no offset 
in the other industry. The stable sector is made to bear some of the 
costs of the fluctuations in the unstable sector. Consequently, the latter 
expands relative to the former, and the average instability in the econ 
omy increases.
Public insurance with a uniform payroll tax may generate the same 
two moral hazard problems as private insurance. First, there is the pos 
sibility that, while unemployed, workers postpone the acceptance of a 
job offer because their cost of unemployment is very low or zero. Sec 
ond, employers have no motivation to enhance employment smooth 
ing: they cannot expect to pay lower wages by offering less job 
volatility, since all workers currently have complete earnings stability. 
As in the case of private insurance, both types of moral hazard may be 
partially avoided by raising worker participation in the insurance.
Continuing our numerical illustrations, a new long-run equilibrium 
might now have the following characteristics. Let the disposable 
incomes in both industries be $24,000, of which, in the unstable indus 
try, $1,125 consists of UI benefits. There is a 2.4 percent uniform pay 
roll tax, which amounts to $576 per employee in the stable industry 
and $549 [= 0.024($24,000 - $1,125)] per employee in the unstable 
industry. Hence, the annual marginal cost of an employee is $24,576 
(that is, $24,000 + $576) in the stable industry and $23,424 (that is, 
$24,000 - $1,125 + $549) in the unstable industry. Any administrative 
cost of the system would raise the payroll tax, but this would not affect 
the main arguments concerning the effects of a uniform UI tax. As 
compared with self-insurance by employees, the relative marginal cost 
of labor falls in the unstable industry and rises in the stable industry; 
this tends to lead to an expansion of the unstable industry and a con 
traction of the stable industry.
Public Insurance with an Experience-Rated Payroll Tax
We now allow for an experience-rated UI tax. It differs from the uni 
form tax in that employers© tax rates are linked to the claims experi 
ence of their own employees.
A concept that may be useful in the following discussion is the 
degree of experience rating. This measure ranges from zero to full, and
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then to complete. A zero degree of experience rating corresponds to a 
uniform tax, which has already been discussed. Complete experience 
rating is defined as the immediate and total payment by employers of 
their employees© UI claims. 1 We define an intermediate degree of expe 
rience rating as full experience rating. This exists when each employer 
is assigned a tax rate appropriate to his/her risk class. A specific risk 
class consists of employers with similar claims experiences, so that 
their tax liabilities, when averaged over a sufficiently long period of 
time, are the same. In the short run, any one employer may have a defi 
cit or a surplus with the other members of the risk class, but, in the long 
run, all employers pay fully for the UI claims of their own employees.
Two important implications of a public UI system with experience 
rating are worth emphasizing. First, when there is some degree of 
experience rating, but it is not complete, this type of UI plan provides 
insurance to employers as well as to employees. Unemployment bene 
fits serve to smooth employees© income streams, and the experience- 
rated tax structure tends to generate an even tax flow for employers. It 
thus serves to smooth also the employers© cash flows.
Second, there is no direct link between the degree of experience rat 
ing in the employer tax structure and the amount of income smoothing 
provided to qualified unemployed workers. Complete employee 
income smoothing may coexist with no experience rating or with com 
plete experience rating. The degree of experience rating affects only 
the amount and timing of the employer©s tax flows. In this respect, an 
experience-rated public UI system is crucially different from a typical 
private insurance program. Under private systems, complete experi 
ence rating is tantamount to self-insurance by employees, while, under 
public systems, it leads to self-insurance by employers only, with no 
impact on employee insurance. Indeed, complete experience rating 
may be viewed as a mechanism through which employers provide UI 
to their own employees at the price of reduced average earnings. If 
employers are less risk averse than employees, such an arrangement is 
clearly beneficial to both parties.
Consider again our two-industry example, and suppose that the UI 
tax is fully experience rated so that employers in the unstable industry 
pay wholly for the cost of the unemployment benefits over an appropri 
ate period of time. Further, in our illustration, employers in the stable 
industry pay no UI taxes because their employees never draw unem-
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ployment benefits. As in the case of the uniform tax previously dis 
cussed, employees in the unstable industry are assumed to receive a 
constant flow of disposable income at the same annual rate as employ 
ees in the stable industry.
Thus, employees in the unstable industry, when on layoff, receive 
their full disposable income in the form of unemployment benefits. 
There is no need for any residual self-insurance by these employees, 
and the expected annual disposable incomes are the same in both 
industries. The employers in this industry must now pay, as part of 
their labor costs, for the unemployment benefits received by their 
employees plus any administrative costs of the insurance. Full experi 
ence rating ensures that UI does not lead to a significant change in the 
relative marginal costs of labor in the two industries. As with self- 
insurance and private insurance, but in contrast to public insurance 
with a uniform tax, there is no incentive to expand the unstable sector 
at the expense of the stable sector.
As far as the moral hazard, there is an important difference between, 
on the one hand, private insurance and public insurance with a uniform 
tax and, on the other hand, public insurance with an experience-rated 
tax. This distinction arises from employer incentives to control layoffs. 
Under an experience-rated tax, employers receive a direct reward, via 
reduced taxes, for marginally reducing their layoffs. No such direct 
marginal reward exists under private insurance or public insurance 
with a uniform tax. Experience rating serves to remove, at least par 
tially, some of the inherent UI inefficiencies due to moral hazard. The 
other cause of moral hazard, the incentive for the jobless to reject alter 
native employment offers, remains unaffected. 2
A numerical example may again be helpful. Suppose that the dis 
posable income in both industries is $25,200. In the stable industry, 
this consists entirely of earnings, while in the unstable industry, dispos 
able income consists of $22,500 received as earnings from employers 
plus $2,700 in unemployment benefits. With full experience rating, 
employers in the unstable industry are subject to an average payroll tax 
of 12 percent, which is just adequate to raise the $2,700 for the benefits 
paid to employees. Any costs of administering the system would 
increase the payroll tax.
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The Case for Experience Rating
A comparison of a public UI system with no experience rating (i.e., 
a uniform tax) with one that is fully experience rated yields two key 
conclusions. First, unless all employers in the system belong to the 
same risk class, a uniform tax will lead to a distortion of relative prices 
and thus the cross-subsidization of unstable by stable activities. As a 
result, unstable activities are encouraged, and stable ones are discour 
aged. Full experience rating avoids these problems and generates an 
allocation of resources similar to that of well-functioning markets. 
Less-than-full experience rating leads to cross-subsidization.
Joseph Becker (1972, 1981) emphasized the distortion of relative 
prices and the consequent cross-subsidization in the UI system when 
there is less-than-full experience rating. He referred to these problems 
as inappropriate "cost accounting." Further, his empirical investiga 
tions showed that construction firms tended to be heavily subsidized by 
other businesses, especially those in finance, the services, and trade. In 
the long run, this situation must be expected to lead to relatively low 
output prices, relatively high real wages, and relative overproduction in 
the subsidized sectors as compared to the operation of perfect markets. 
For further analysis, see Adams (1986).
Subsequent empirical work has confirmed Becker©s original 
research finding of substantial cross-subsidization among firms and 
industries. The most recent microeconomic empirical analyses of 
cross-subsidization have been presented in Laurence (1993) and 
Anderson and Meyer (1994). An attempt at estimating the impact of 
the cross-subsidization upon relative employment levels was under 
taken by Deere (1991), who concluded that "a 10% increase in the 
implicit subsidy to a layoff increases the employment share in con 
struction by about 1.7% and decreases the employment share in ser 
vices by almost 1%."
The second basic difference between a uniform and an experience- 
rated UI tax relates to the incentives for employers to control layoffs by 
changing employment practices. Many theoretical aspects of the incen 
tive effects of experience rating have been treated in the literature. Two 
well-known articles are the ones by Feldstein (1976) and Baily (1978). 
In addition, Brechling (1977) has presented a model of the incentive 
effects in the institutional framework of the most common U.S. method
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of experience rating (that is, the reserve ratio method). This line of 
research has been continued by Wolcowitz (1984) and Cook (1992).
Briefly, the argument states that since experience rating implies a 
marginal tax cost for layoffs, a cost-minimizing employer will attempt 
to adjust layoff practices in response to increases in the degree of expe 
rience rating, so as to reduce the level of layoffs, benefit payments, 
and, hence, employer taxes. The incentive is optimized when there is 
full experience rating because this would lead to the same level of lay 
offs that would be generated in perfectly working commodity, capital, 
and labor markets. This result is especially clear in the Feldstein (1976) 
model.
The Case against Experience Rating
We are aware of two kinds of counterarguments to the case for expe 
rience rating. Since these criticisms have usually been made in com 
ments on papers or in conversation, it is difficult to credit them to 
particular individuals. Hence, they are presented here without attribu 
tion.
1. It is often argued that individual employers do not react to experi 
ence rating by altering their layoff patterns. There are two versions of 
this position. First, the shifting of the tax removes any incentive for 
firms to control their layoffs, and, second, even with an appropriate 
incentive, employers are unable to control layoffs. Let us consider 
these two versions in turn.
The first line of reasoning is that since the burden of the UI tax is 
likely to be shifted forward via changes in output prices or backward 
via changes in wages, it cannot have any incentive effects; thus, experi 
ence rating cannot be effective in reducing layoffs. This argument is 
based on the implicit assumption that tax shifting takes place instanta 
neously, automatically, and at the level of the individual employer. 
Suppose, for example, that an employer is considering a change in 
maternity leave policy that, ceteris paribus, would reduce taxes by $X 
and have a marginal cost of $K If the employer would invariably have 
to pass on the entire net marginal surplus of $(X - Y) to workers in the 
form of increased wages (and/or to customers in the form of reduced 
output prices), then the marginal return to the employer would always 
be zero. Here, tax shifting has been defined in such a narrow fashion
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that the employer has no inducement to introduce new technology, 
because any net benefit in the form of higher profits is immediately 
passed on to others. Thus, there cannot be a profit motive, as econo 
mists normally understand that concept.
This narrow view of tax shifting is not supported in the relevant pub 
lic finance literature. The approach is also incompatible with competi 
tive theory in which prices and wages are determined by market 
demand and supply and cannot be influenced by the actions of an indi 
vidual employer.
In contrast to the narrow view of tax shifting, it seems reasonable to 
assume, as we have done in the illustrative two-industry model, that 
some industry average of the UI tax is shifted forward or backward and 
that the behavior of any one employer does not affect the average tax 
significantly. In this case, individual employers correctly treat their 
output prices and wages (or compensation packages) as independent of 
their own attempts to reduce their tax bills; employers can reap, 
through higher profits, the full net benefits of any changes in layoff pat 
terns that accrue to them through experience rating.
The second version of the argument is based on the assumption that, 
because employers cannot change their layoff and employment pat 
terns, they have very limited ability to respond to the incentives of 
experience rating. Hence, experience rating may be unfair for employ 
ers who operate in markets with particularly uncertain and volatile con 
ditions.
In our view, the level of incentives of the tax system and degree to 
which employers can and do respond to these incentives must be deter 
mined primarily by empirical investigation, not by theoretical argu 
ment. In a very general empirical framework, it is well known that 
Japanese employment practices lead to substantially lower layoff rates 
(and unemployment levels) than are customary in the U.S., yet Japa 
nese firms have been well able to compete successfully in international 
markets. Hence, it would appear that there are some opportunities for 
U.S. employers to change their layoff patterns. Furthermore, empirical 
work in the U.S. institutional framework has shown repeatedly that 
employers do react to high marginal tax costs of layoffs by reducing 
layoffs. The initial findings by Feldstein (1978), Brechling (1981), 
Clark and Summers (1982), and Topel (1983) have been supplemented 
recently by the research of Card and Levine (1994) and Anderson and
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Meyer (1994). We, therefore, reject the assertion that, in general, 
employers cannot control their layoff patterns under an experience- 
rated UI tax structure.
2. It is sometimes argued that experience rating violates the basic 
principles of insurance and that it should be incomplete or even be 
replaced by a uniform tax. Our discussion earlier in this section has 
shown that full experience rating is quite compatible with accepted 
insurance principles. With experience rating, both employers and 
employees can be provided with some insurance. Even if experience 
rating were complete, only employers would lose their coverage, while 
employees would remain insured.
The Two Dominant Methods of Experience Rating
The UI system in the U.S. has been established under both federal 
and state laws. The federal statutes lay down general guidelines, under 
which the states have substantial leeway to fashion systems to suit their 
own circumstances. Thus, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) 
mandates that there be experience-rated payroll taxes, but the determi 
nation of the exact method of experience rating is left to the individual 
states. States have enacted various methods of experience rating and, 
within the same methods, different parameter values. Two forms of 
experience rating are used predominantly: 3 the reserve ratio method 
(used in 32 states) and the benefit ratio method (used in 15 states). 
Although these approaches have much in common, their differences 
may have important implications for the economic incentives they give 
to employers to alter employment patterns. First, we will review the 
common characteristics of these approaches.
Common Features of the Two Experience-Rating Methods
The two experience-rating methods share five features. These ele 
ments are (1) the computation of the taxable payroll, (2) the concept of 
charged benefits, (3) time lags, (4) the suspension of experience rating 
under certain circumstances, and (5) trust fund solvency provisions.
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The Taxable Payroll
The firm©s UI tax bill (T) for a particular calendar year is the product 
of its tax rate (x) and its taxable payroll (W) for that year. The taxable 
payroll, in turn, consists of the cumulated earnings of all employees up 
to the taxable wage base ( w ) for each employee in each calendar year. 
On January 1, the process of cumulating earnings starts over again. The 
minimum taxable wage base is set by FUTA, but higher bases may be 
mandated by state legislatures. In 1994, the federal taxable wage base 
was $7,000 and the state bases ranged up to $25,000.
Throughout this book, we assume that the taxable payroll per 
employee is equal to the taxable wage base and that the employer©s 
total taxable payroll is the product of the taxable wage base and the 
mean of the employment levels at the beginning and the end of the 
year.
Thus, if the taxable wage base is $10,000 and the employer©s work 
force falls from 500 at the beginning of the calendar year to 400 at the 
end of the year, the taxable payroll is assumed to be ($10,000) (1/2) 
(500 + 400) = $4,500,000.
The preceding approximation of the taxable payroll may be dis 
torted for two reasons. First, employment growth may not be smooth 
between January 1 and December 31, so that the average employment 
in the example may not be 450. Second, even if the level of employ 
ment does not change during the year, interfirm labor turnover tends to 
influence the size of the taxable payroll. Suppose, for example, that the 
taxable wage base is $10,000 and that the annual wage paid in a partic 
ular job is $20,000. If the job is filled by one employee for the entire 
year, then the taxable payroll with respect to this position is $10,000. 
If, on the other hand, the same job is filled by one employee in the first 
six months and by a different employee during the second six months, 
then the taxable payroll is $20,000 because the employer has to cumu 
late earnings up to $10,000 for each employee. See Brechling (1977) 
for a general formulation and elaboration of these points and Brechling 
(1981) for an empirical verification.
Our approximation of the taxable payroll may be stated in equation 
form:
(2.1) Wt = fcj (#, + #,_!>,
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where Nt represents employment at year-end and Nt_i represents 
employment at the beginning of year t. In general, the subscript t refers 
to a calendar year. The equation relates to the formal analysis that will 
be developed in later chapters.
Charged Benefits
An employer©s unemployment experience is measured by his/her 
charged benefits (CB) under both the reserve and the benefit ratio 
methods of experience rating. Charged benefits are the total annual 
unemployment benefits that have been paid to the employer©s laid-off 
workers and that have been deemed to be chargeable to the employer©s 
account. Not all unemployment benefits are chargeable. Examples of 
noncharged benefits are benefits paid to voluntary quitters, some 
"extended" benefits legislated specifically in particularly severe reces 
sions, and some benefits paid for employee dependents.
Charged benefits arise from both temporary and permanent layoffs. 
Temporary layoffs are those leading only to relatively short-lived 
reductions in employment. These cutbacks are reversed by new hires or 
recalls after fairly brief periods of time. From the perspective of our 
current discussion, as introduced in chapter 1, the most important char 
acteristic of temporary layoffs is that they do not lead to significant 
long-run reductions in the taxable payroll. Permanent layoffs, by con 
trast, are defined as lasting curtailments in the work force and do imply 
a decrease in the taxable payroll.
It should perhaps be pointed out that the distinction between tempo 
rary and permanent layoffs need not necessarily correspond to the 
unemployment experiences of individual workers. As an example, sup 
pose that worker A is laid off and that worker B is hired as a replace 
ment after a short time. If A remains unemployed for a long period, 
then the layoff is regarded as temporary by the employer but as perma 
nent by the employee. In this study, layoffs are categorized as tempo 
rary or permanent according to the employer©s perception. To be sure, 
since the rate of recall is typically very high among temporary layoffs, 
the latter are likely to be perceived as temporary by both the employer 
and by most of the affected employees.
Our subsequent analysis is facilitated by specifying a temporary lay 
off rate (w), which measures the proportion of the average stock of 
employees laid off in a calendar year. Thus, if the layoff rate is 10 per-
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cent and the average level of employment is 450 (as in the preceding 
example), then the hypothetical employer effects 45 temporary layoffs 
in the calendar year. Permanent layoffs are measured by the net reduc 
tion in the level of employment over the course of the calendar year. In 
the example, permanent layoffs amount to 100 (i.e., 500 - 400). Per 
manent layoffs are zero when the employer adds to employment over 
the course of the year.
Both temporary and permanent layoffs qualify for unemployment 
benefits. The weekly benefit payment (b) is determined by state law, 
usually at about one-half of previous earnings, subject to a maximum. 
We shall use the concept of benefits per unemployment spell (b). This 
is simply the product of the weekly benefit payment and the number of 
weeks that the laid-off worker receives unemployment compensation. 
Thus, if the weekly benefit payment is $250 and the duration of the 
unemployment spell is 12 weeks, the benefit per unemployment spell is 
(12) ($250) = $3,000. This would be the amount of benefits charged to 
the employer©s account with respect to each layoff. In practice, the 
weekly benefit payment and the unemployment duration are likely to 
differ among employees. Hence, the $3,000 should be considered as an 
average for all layoffs.
The level of charged benefits can be expressed as the following 
equation:
(2.2) CBt = b[ut (Nt _ l+ Nt) + (#,_!-#
where (Nt_} - Nt) = (Nt_} - Nt) if (fy_7 - Nt) > 0 
and (Nt_j - Nt) = 0 if (Nt_} - Nt) < 0.
The first term in the square brackets in equation (2.2) represents 
temporary layoffs, and the second term represents permanent layoffs.
Time Lags
With both types of experience rating, there are substantial periods of 
time between the year when unemployment benefits are paid and 
charged to an employer and the year when the tax rate changes. Typi 
cally, the employer tax rate for 1994, for example, would have been 
determined between June and October of 1993, based on the layoff 
experience over the years 1990, 1991, and 1992. These time lags pre-
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vent the immediate response of taxes to charged benefits and may 
cause inequality between a firm©s charged benefits and its tax payments 
in any particular year. Furthermore, neither method allows for interest 
payments or discounting. Thus, even if the firm pays $100 in taxes for 
each $100 of charged benefits, the lag of the former behind the latter 
implies that, in present value terms, tax payments fall short of charged 
benefits.
Suspension of Experience Rating
Experience rating is partially or fully suspended in certain circum 
stances under both the reserve ratio and the benefit ratio methods. In 
particular, minimum and maximum tax rates (TMIN and TMAX) are speci 
fied by state laws. Changes in charged benefits do not affect these min 
imum or maximum tax rates, and, as long as an employer is and 
expects to remain at the minimum or maximum tax rate, changes in 
charged benefits cannot affect his/her tax bill. The minimum tax rate 
ensures that all employers make a minimal contribution to the UI sys 
tem. It is usually regarded as necessary to pay for the noncharged ben 
efits that are not attributable to any particular employer. The maximum 
rate alleviates the tax burden for employers with particularly high past 
unemployment experiences. At the maximum and minimum rates, ben 
efits are said to be ineffectively charged because they are not allowed to 
influence employers© individual tax rates.
Experience rating is also absent for new employers since they have 
no history of layoffs. Typically, they are assigned an initial fixed tax 
rate until they acquire the necessary unemployment experience. 4 In 
some states, this tax rate varies according to the unemployment experi 
ence of the industry in which the new employer is located.
Another suspension of experience rating occurs in the case of bank 
rupt or inactive employers. The costs of unemployment benefits paid to 
these employers© laid-off workers may be charged to the employers© 
accounts, but since they have ceased to operate, their payrolls and tax 
liabilities are zero, no matter what their accumulated charged benefits 
may be.
Trust Fund Solvency
If all unemployment benefits were fully charged and there were no 
time lags or suspensions in the experience-rating methods, the current
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tax payments of all employers would be adequate to pay for all current 
unemployment benefits. If, in addition, a small tax were levied to 
recover administration costs, then the UI system would be totally self- 
financed in any particular year. Since the required conditions are not 
satisfied, however, the UI system may run an annual deficit or surplus. 
To allow for the carry-over of deficit or surplus balances from one year 
to another, state trust funds have been established. Employer tax 
payments (as well as interest and some other disbursements from the 
federal government) are credited to the state©s trust fund, and 
unemployment benefit payments are debited.
To ensure the long-run solvency of their trust funds, all states have 
made provisions for some or all tax rates to rise (fall) as the trust fund 
balance, expressed as a percentage of the state©s total taxable payroll, 
falls (rises). 5 These changes in tax schedules are automatic and do not 
require specific legislation. States differ in the methods by which their 
tax structures respond to changes in the trust fund balance. In Louisi 
ana, for example, a falling trust fund balance triggers equiproportionate 
increases in experience-rated tax rates. Thus, with given taxable pay 
rolls, employers with high UI tax rates face larger increases in their tax 
bills than do employers with low tax rates. In Mississippi, by contrast, 
a fixed absolute amount is added to all UI tax rates, thus distributing 
the tax burden equally across employers. As a third illustration, Minne 
sota raises just the minimum tax rate (TMIN), thus only raising the tax 
burden of employers with the best experience record. Though the dis 
tribution of the extra tax burden may differ among states, all states 
have made provisions for aggregate tax inflows to increase as the trust 
fund declines or, indeed, becomes negative.
In general, state laws governing employer experience rating may be 
regarded as allocating UI costs to individual employers. Laws govern 
ing changes in average tax rates are designed to ensure the solvency of 
the system as a whole.
While the reserve ratio and the benefit ratio methods of experience 
rating may be viewed from the perspective of their common dimen 
sions, these two approaches differ in several important respects. We 
now turn to a description of their unique characteristics.
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Distinctive Features of the Two Experience-Rating Methods
The Reserve Ratio Method
Under the reserve ratio method of experience rating, each employer 
is assigned an account similar to an ordinary checking account. The 
account contains the employer©s past tax payments as deposits and past 
charged benefits as debits. During any particular year, the balance in 
this account rises by the amount of tax payments and falls by the 
amount of charged benefits. At the end of a year t, the balance (Bt), 
which may be negative, is thus equal to all past tax payments minus all 
past charged benefits. As noted before, according to current laws, the 
employer neither receives interest on positive balances nor pays inter 
est on negative balances.
The employer©s reserve ratio (RR) is defined as the ratio of the bal 
ance to the taxable payroll, where the latter is usually averaged over the 
past three-to-five calendar years. The reserve ratio is usually expressed 
as a percentage. As an example, assume that the hypothetical employer 




With a balance at the end of 1992 of $200,000, the employer©s reserve 
ratio at the end of 1992 would have been:
RR92 = 100 200, 000
L . | I (4| 500, 000 + 4, 700, 000 + 4, 800,000)
= 100(.0429) = 4.29%.
The essence of the reserve ratio method of experience rating is the 
negative link between the reserve ratio and the tax rate. Figure 2.1 
illustrates a typical tax schedule.6 The tax rate for year t is measured 
along the vertical axis, and the lagged reserve ratio is shown along the 
horizontal axis. The schedule is kinked at RR below which TMAX 
applies, and at RR above which TMIN applies. As previously mentioned, 
the tax rate responds to changes in the reserve ratio with a substantial
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lag. Typically, the firm©s tax rate for year t is determined in the June- 
October period of year (t - 1) on the basis of the firm©s reserve ratio at 
the end of year (t - 2).7 The tax schedule in figure 2.1 is valid only for a 
particular range of values of the state trust fund balance. Higher sched 
ules apply for lower trust fund balances (expressed as a percentage of 
the statewide taxable payroll), and vice versa. In the tax codes of 
reserve ratio states, the various schedules are usually presented in tabu 
lar form.
Figure 2.1 Reserve Ratio Tax Schedule
0 RR RR Reserve Ratio 
(RR,- 2)
The reserve ratio (4.29 percent for the end of 1992  or later in some 
states) can be located on the horizontal axis in figure 2.1. The corre 
sponding tax rate (for 1994, in the example) can then be read off the 
vertical axis.
We now state the main characteristics of the reserve ratio method in 
formal terms. The employer©s balance B at the end of year t is defined
as:
(2.3)
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where m is the total number of years for which the employer has had an 
account and i is a counter from 0 to m. As before, the time subscript t 
dates stocks (such as the balance B) at the end of the year and flows 
(such as tax payments 7) during the year. The reserve ratio RR is 
defined as the ratio of the firm©s balance to a moving average of its tax 
able payroll W:
(2.4) RRt = (n+1) n © ,
where (n+1) is the number of years over which the moving average of 
the taxable payroll is calculated. Typically (n+1) is three-to-five years. 
As discussed, the essential element of the reserve ratio method of 
experience rating is that the tax rate T and the reserve ratio RR are neg 
atively related:
(2.5) T, = a-s(x ltRR + %2t RRt _ 2 + X3t RR) ,
where a is the intercept of the tax schedule, which must be positive, 
and s is the slope of the tax schedule, which should lie between 0 and 
1. Typically, a is in the range of 5 to 8 percent and s is in the range of 
0.25 to 0.50. As previously mentioned, there are minimum and maxi 
mum tax rates (TMAX and TMIN) mat are triggered at critically low (RR} 
and high (RR) reserve ratios. The Xs are dummy variables that repre 
sent the three ranges of the tax schedule. Specifically,
1. When RRt_2 < RR then (xltt X2tt ^ = (1,0, 0)
and Tt = TMAX = a - sRR; the firm is at the maximum tax rate.
2. When RR < RRt_2 < RR then (%lt, %2t, ;&,) = (0, 1, 0)
and T, = TSLOPE = a ~ sRRt-2-> me ^Tm *s on me experience-rated 
segment of the tax schedule.
3. When RR < RRt_2 ther^,, X2t, *3,) = (0, 0, 1)
and T, = TMIN = a - sRR; the firm is at the minimum tax rate.
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The Benefit Ratio Method
Under the benefit ratio method of experience rating, the firm©s tax 
rate is related positively to its benefit ratio BR. The benefit ratio is 
defined as the ratio of a moving average of charged benefits CBt to a 
moving average of the taxable payroll Wt . Usually the averages are 
computed over three to five calendar years. Thus, in the example of the 
previous section, the hypothetical employer©s average taxable payroll 
for the years 1990, 1991, and 1992 was $4,666,667. With an average 
annual level of charged benefits of $140,000 over the same three years, 
the benefit ratio for this period would be 140,000/4,666,667 = 3 per 
cent. For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to it as the 1992 benefit 
ratio (BR92).
The benefit ratio method of experience rating is based on a positive 
relationship between the tax rate in year t, which is 1994, in the present 
example, and the benefit ratio in year (t - 2), which is 1992 in the 
present example. The tax schedule is illustrated in figure 2.2. It shows 
that TMIN applies when the benefit ratio is below BR. varies positively 
with the benefit ratio along the sloped part of the schedule, and is fixed 
at TMAX when the benefit ratio is above BR. As in the case of the reserve 
ratio method, the tax schedule in figure 2.2 moves up and down auto 
matically when the state©s trust fund balance (as a percentage of the 
statewide taxable payroll) falls or rises. Given a 1992 benefit ratio, the 
corresponding tax rate for 1994 can be read from the vertical axis of 
the figure.
More formally, the benefit ratio for an employer is defined as
(2.6)
1 = 0
where, similar to the case of the reserve ratio method (n+l) is the num 
ber of calendar years, over which CB and W are averaged. The com 
plete tax schedule can be expressed as
(2.7) T, = c + k (i ltBR + %2tBRt _ 2 + % 3r (BR) )
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where c is the intercept and k is the slope of the tax schedule. In prac 
tice, c and k are often close to zero and unity, respectively. The vector 
of dummy variables (%i t, %it, Xifot) ensures that the tax schedule con 
sists of three segments, with the following values:
1. When BRt_2 < BR , then (%lt, X2p Xit) = (1, 0, 0)
and T, = TMIN = c + kBR: the firm is at the minimum tax rate.
2. When BR < BRt_2 < BR©, then Cfr f, X2t, X3t) = (0, 1, 0)
and Tt = TSLOPE = c + kBRt_2 , the firm is on the experience-rated 
segment of the tax schedule.
3. When BR < BRt_2 then_(^lr, X2t, #3/) = (0, 0, 1)
and T, = TMAX = c + kBR, ; the firm is at the maximum tax rate.
Figure 2.2 Benefit Ratio Tax Schedule
Tax rate
BR BR Benefit Ratio
Basic Differences of the Two Methods
In evaluating the essential differences between the reserve and bene 
fit ratio methods of experience rating, we first consider the information 
contained in these measures. The reserve ratio is a summary record of 
all the employer©s past tax payments and charged benefits. It is a com 
prehensive indicator of the relevant relationships with the UI system.
Principles of Insurance and the Current Structure of UI 31
By contrast, the benefit ratio measures only the charged benefits over 
the (n + 1) years. Under the reserve ratio method, employers© tax rates 
are determined by their entire tax and benefit history; under the benefit 
ratio method, the tax is simply the delayed payment for charged bene 
fits.
Second, since the reserve ratio is a summary of all past benefit and 
tax payments, this method has a very long memory. With typical 
parameters, benefits charged 15 years ago may have an influence on 
the current tax rate. The benefit ratio method, on the other hand, forgets 
any benefits that were charged prior to (n + 3), for example, five years 
ago. This point is particularly relevant in a recession, when employers 
are pushed temporarily to the maximum tax rate, where experience rat 
ing is suspended and further benefits are said to be charged ineffec 
tively. Under the benefit ratio method, part or all of these charged 
benefits will be forgotten; under the reserve ratio method, these bene 
fits will be remembered through the falling reserve ratio, which will 
cause increased taxes when economic circumstances improve. In other 
words, benefits are likely to be ineffectively charged permanently 
under the benefit ratio method and ineffectively charged temporarily 
under the reserve ratio method.
Third, the reserve ratio method incorporates the concept of a precau 
tionary financial balance, which can be used for temporary deficits. In 
the course of a typical business cycle, the employer©s fund is built up in 
economic good times and drawn down in bad times. The employer©s 
cyclically fluctuating benefit flow is matched by a fairly smooth tax 
flow; as a result, the employer has a surplus with the system in booms 
and a deficit in recessions. The design provides insurance to the 
employer in accordance with principles described earlier in this chap 
ter. In the absence of business cycles, i.e., when benefit flows are 
smooth, the reserve ratio method generates a long-run (steady-state) 
balance and reserve ratio. By contrast, the benefit ratio method is sim 
ply a "pay-as-you-go" system, in which payment occurs with a lag. It 
does not incorporate explicitly the concept of a precautionary balance 
that can support temporary deficits.
Fourth, the relationship between charged benefits and taxes is more 
complex and has longer lags under the reserve than under the benefit 
ratio method. As an illustration, suppose that the tax rate remains at 
less than the maximum. Under the reserve ratio method, an increase in
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charged benefits of $100 will reduce, ceteris paribus, the balance by 
$100. This reduction, in turn, will raise taxes after two years by less 
than $100 (with typical parameter values) but maintain increased taxes 
for many years until the entire $100 is paid. Under the benefit ratio 
method, the $100 in benefits would be paid by increased taxes in years 
3, 4, and 5.
The Degree of Experience Rating
We have defined the degree of experience rating in terms of the 
closeness of the link between charged benefits and the resulting taxes. 
We will now develop this concept further by specific reference to the 
two methods of experience rating.
A zero degree of experience rating is achieved under either method 
when the payroll tax is independent of charged benefits. This would be 
reflected by a zero slope of the tax schedules in figures 2.1 and 2.2.
The degree of experience rating incorporated in the system would 
increase as a result of the following parameter changes. First, if the 
maximum tax rate TMAX is raised and/or the minimum tax rate TMIN is 
lowered, then the ranges over which the reserve and benefit ratios are 
on the sloped parts of the tax schedule increase; thus, the employer is 
more likely to be experience rated.
Second, the closer the slope of the tax schedule is to unity, the closer 
is the numerical response of the tax to charged benefits. Therefore, the 
degree of experience rating is higher.
Third, the shorter the time period between the disbursement of bene 
fits and the payment of taxes, the fewer interest-free loans are made. 
Consequently, the degree of experience rating is greater.
Fourth, given that there are some irreducible time lags between ben 
efit disbursements, the degree of experience rating can also be raised 
by appropriate interest charges and credits, so that interest-free loans 
are precluded. This could be done very easily under the reserve ratio 
method by paying interest on positive employer fund balances and by 
charging interest on negative balances.
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Experience Rating and Temporary Layoffs
The relationship between temporary layoffs and an experience-rated 
UI tax was examined in the previously mentioned papers by Feldstein 
(1976) and Baily (1977). Their characterization of experience rating 
was very general, however. As an example, Feldstein simply used the 
parameter e (which ranges from zero to one) to describe the degree of 
experience rating. Brechling (1977) used a model of the reserve ratio 
method of experience rating (without maximum and minimum tax 
rates) and studied the impact on the incentive to lay off workers. Wol- 
cowitz (1984) extended this work by allowing for maximum and mini 
mum tax rates and by elaborating on the full, dynamic implications of 
the reserve ratio method. Cook (1992) furthered the analysis by consid 
ering the benefit ratio as well as the reserve ratio method of experience 
rating.
The cited literature is based on a model of the individual firm. The 
firm can vary temporary layoffs from which it derives some net mar 
ginal benefit. In the absence of an experience-rated UI system, optimal 
layoffs are determined at the point where their net marginal benefits are 
zero. A constant payroll tax indicates a zero marginal tax cost of lay 
offs and consequently a relatively high level of layoffs. In contrast, 
both methods of experience rating may imply positive marginal tax 
costs of layoffs, thereby giving incentives to employers to reduce lay 
offs below the level generated by zero net marginal benefits.
In her detailed analysis of the two methods of experience rating, 
Cook (1992) reaches the following general conclusions. First, the 
reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods are quite different in their 
dynamic implications. The reserve ratio method gives rise to dynamic 
decision rules, which require that the firm adopt optimal paths of lay 
offs crucially dependent on the initial and final reserve ratios. Changes 
in exogenous factors tend to affect the entire optimal path of layoffs. 
By contrast, the benefit ratio method results in static decision rules, 
which require, with unchanged exogenous factors, a constant optimal 
layoff rate, independent of its future or past levels. Changes in exoge 
nous factors lead to instantaneous adjustment in the optimal layoff 
rate.
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Second, when a typical firm starts and expects to remain on the hor 
izontal sections of the tax schedules, that is, at TMAX or TMIN» then, 
under both methods of experience rating, the marginal tax cost of lay 
offs is zero, and the layoff rate is the same as under a tax not based on 
experience rating. In these cases, there is no difference between the 
two methods of experience rating because neither is operative.
Third, when a hypothetical firm is and expects to remain on the 
sloped segment of the tax schedule, then both methods of experience 
rating yield positive marginal tax costs of layoffs and lead to optimal 
layoffs below those generated by a system without experience rating. 
Further, the higher the slope of the tax schedule (s or k) and the lower 
the rate of discount (that is, the interest rate), the higher the marginal 
tax costs will be and the lower the optimal layoff rate. With realistic 
parameter settings, the implied marginal tax costs are quite similar 
under the two methods of experience rating. There are no inherent 
characteristics of the two methods that give rise to differences in layoff 
behavior when the firm starts and remains on the slope of the tax 
schedule.
Fourth, when, due to some exogenous change, the firm starts on one 
segment of the tax schedule and ends up on another, the two methods 
lead to different behavior. The reserve ratio method adjusts layoffs 
gradually from the old to the new level, while the benefit ratio adjusts 
layoffs instantaneously to the new equilibrium level. Thus, when the 
firm moves from the sloped to the flat segments of the tax schedule, the 
reserve ratio method leads to lower average layoff rates than the benefit 
ratio method. On the other hand, when the firm moves from the flat to 
the sloped segments of the tax schedules, the benefit ratio method leads 
to lower average layoff rates than the reserve ratio method.
As previously discussed, the results of empirical work over the past 
15 years or so seem to lend substantial support to the theoretical claim 
that the degree of experience rating has a significant negative impact on 
the level of temporary layoffs and on unemployment. In the work by 
Topel (1983), Card and Levine (1994), and Anderson and Meyer 
(1994), the characteristics of the two experience-rating methods are 
embodied in the estimates of the "marginal tax costs" (MTC) of lay 
offs. Hence, any essential differences between the two methods of 
experience rating should be reflected in differences in their MTCs.
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Concluding Remarks
We have attempted to set the stage for the analysis to be presented in 
the following chapters. The primary concern of previous investigators 
of experience rating has been its impact on temporary layoffs. Unem 
ployment benefits for temporary layoffs are often justified in terms of 
insurance principles. Insurance serves to maintain disposable incomes 
of employees during temporary layoffs, and employees pay for this 
service via reduced average earnings.
In the U.S. system, employers are directly responsible for the pay 
ment of UI taxes. This gives rise to a possible additional insurance 
attribute, the smoothing of the typical employer©s cash flows.
In customary private insurance arrangements (e.g., automobile 
insurance), experience rating is applied to the premiums paid by the 
insurant. Experience rating in public UI situations, on the other hand, 
refers to the experience of employers. When experience rating is full, 
employers pay, over an appropriately long period of time, for all the 
unemployment benefits received by their own former workers. When 
experience rating is less than full, there exists (1) long-run cross-subsi 
dization of one group of firms by another, which, in turn, leads to a 
misallocation of resources, and (2) a possibly substantial moral hazard 
problem, which implies nonoptimally large layoffs. When experience 
rating is complete, employers pay fully and immediately for all of their 
former employees© benefits. Thus, employers lose their (cash flow 
smoothing) insurance entirely, but employees are still insured.
Empirical investigations of UI taxes and benefits have shown that 
there are sizable cross-subsidizations, so that, by and large, actual 
experience-rating systems in the U.S. are less than full. Further, there is 
now convincing evidence that increases in the degree of experience rat 
ing reduce layoffs significantly. For these reasons, an increase in the 
degree of UI experience rating for temporary layoffs is a desirable 
social goal.
We have described the technical aspects of the two most common 
experience-rated UI tax systems as well as their implications for tem 
porary layoffs. The methods differ in their dynamic effects and in the 
length of their memory. The degree of experience rating can be ele 
vated by (1) raising the maximum tax rate, (2) lowering the minimum
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tax rate, (3) increasing the slope of the tax schedule, if it is below unity, 
or (4) charging interest on outstanding benefits. We have a preference 
for the reserve ratio method of experience rating because it has a longer 
memory and can easily be amended to reflect the appropriate financial 
cost by paying interest on employers© positive balances and by 
charging interest on negative balances.
Against this background, we now turn to an examination of perma 
nent layoffs. Three basic questions will be addressed. How important 
are permanent as compared to temporary layoffs? How should the 
costs of permanent layoffs be covered? How do the two most common 
methods of experience rating treat the costs of permanent layoffs?
NOTES
1. Complete experience rating is actually approximated in the U.S. by the so-called reimburs 
able method of experience rating, for which certain not-for-profit companies and local govern 
ment agencies qualify. See also note 3.
2. In the preceding discussion, we have assumed, for the sake of expository ease, that workers 
receive unemployment benefits equal to their previous earnings, that is, that the replacement ratio 
is unity. In practice, replacement ratios are 40 to 60 percent; thus, there is a substantial amount of 
self-insurance by employees. The more self-insurance there is, the less important are the moral 
hazard problems associated with the three types of insurance systems.
3. The other two types of experience rating are the benefit wage ratio method, used in two 
states, and the payroll decline method, used in one state. In addition, there is the reimbursable 
method (mentioned in note 1), which may be chosen by qualifying nonprofit and government 
employers in all states. The reimbursable method is not related to a payroll tax. Employers are 
simply sent a bill for UI benefits paid to their employees.
4. The time period over which a new firm pays a tax not based on experience rating ranges 
from one to four years.
5. Negative trust fund balances imply that the states must borrow from the federal govern 
ment. States have to pay interest on these loans. Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor may impose 
a special federal tax to recoup loans to state trust funds. Thus, states have definite incentives to 
avoid negative trust fund balances.
6. Most actual tax schedules consist of small steps along the sloped part and of one or two 
larger steps in the neighborhood of the zero reserve ratio.
7. In figure 2.1, the reserve ratio at the end of 1992 determines the tax rate in 1994. Some 
states use a shorter lag between the reserve ratio and the tax rate. For instance, in New York State, 
the reserve ratio for December 31, 1993, is computed as the ratio of the firm©s trust fund balance 
on that date to the taxable payroll for the period of October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993. The 
tax rate for 1994 is then determined on the basis of the reserve ratio on December 31, 1993. The 
longer lag, presented in the text, is used by most states.
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Recent Trends in Permanent 
and Temporary Layoffs
How important are temporary layoffs in comparison to permanent 
layoffs? If declines in employment are for the most part temporary, 
then the design of the unemployment insurance (UI) system should be 
such that the firm creating the layoff pays for the benefits received by 
workers. However, if much of the employment decline is permanent, 
this pool of unemployed labor serves as a reserve available for growing 
firms to hire (Hall 1971). The expanding enterprise gains from the per 
manent layoff and thus may be assessed part of the associated UI cost.
Using unpublished data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
(1966-1971) of work experience of men between the ages of 45 and 59, 
Feldstein (1976) found that 61 percent of the unemployed were on 
temporary layoff. Crosslin, Hanna, and Stevens, who used data from 
the ES-202 Report and from the U.S. Department of Labor©s Continu 
ous Wage and Benefit History program data base (1979-1983) for five 
states, concurred with Feldstein©s results. Yet, Murphy and Topel 
(1987), working with information from the Annual Demographic File 
(1968-1985) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), found that, for 
males between the ages of 18 and 64, permanent, not temporary, sepa 
rations accounted for a larger fraction of the unemployment rate. This 
relationship persisted over the study period as unemployment rose in 
the downturn of the business cycle, except during 1975, when tempo 
rary, rather than permanent, layoffs were a higher fraction of the unem 
ployment rate.
Using firm and individual employment information from the UI 
administrative records of six states, Anderson and Meyer (1994) 
decomposed the fraction of employees receiving benefits into those on 
temporary or on permanent layoff. They found that the proportion of 
employees receiving UI benefits on permanent layoff ranged from 24 
to 66 percent across the six states.
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The Data
Our study utilizes two longitudinal data sets for establishments from 
the records of the Texas Employment Commission, which administers 
the UI program in the state. The first set contains quarterly employ 
ment statistics for 101,169 establishments, either with continuous 
employment or declared bankruptcy, from the years 1978 to 1982. This 
sample represents 60 percent of employment in the state. l The second 
set comprises monthly employment data for 822,713 establishments 
from 1978 to 1989. The establishments constitute all those in the state 
with covered employment during the period. However, a maximum of 
approximately 400,000 establishments were in operation in any quar 
ter, such that a large number of births and deaths of establishments 
occurred over this time span.
Each data set provides a different perspective on the issue of 
employment reductions. The major strength of both sets is that they 
enable the calculation of quarter-to-quarter (or month-to-month) 
employment declines, unlike other sources that may have only annual 
or decennial data.
Are employment reductions a fair indication of temporary or perma 
nent layoffs? An employment reduction can occur due to one of four 
reasons: a temporary layoff, a permanent layoff, a quit, or a retirement. 
A quit or retirement can affect the number of both temporary and per 
manent employment declines. If an employer maintains a job, then the 
worker who quits or retires will be replaced. When the replacement 
occurs prior to the worker©s departure, the calculation of respective 
employment declines is unaffected. Otherwise, the quit or retirement 
could be counted as either a temporary or a permanent employment 
decline, depending on how long the position remains vacant. If the 
employer cuts the number of job positions, then the quit or retirement 
will be counted as a permanent employment decline.
The importance of retirements in the calculation is difficult to dis 
cern. However, Murphy and Topel (1987) indicate that quits repre 
sented 10 percent, on average, of the unemployment rate caused by 
temporary layoffs, separations, and quits from 1968 to 1985. Hence, 
employer-initiated spells are dominant in unemployment. As previ-
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ously stated, the proportion of permanent, as opposed to temporary, 
layoffs during the period is consistently greater, except in 1975. 2
If quits were equally distributed between temporary and permanent 
employment declines, the percentage calculation of employment 
declines representing temporary and permanent layoffs would be unaf 
fected. If quits were associated only with permanent declines, then per 
manent layoffs would be overestimated by approximately 5 percent. 3 
The overrepresentation of permanent layoffs would therefore range 
between 0 and 5 percent in the calculations presented subsequently in 
this chapter. How else might these measures be imperfect?
  All reductions in employment may not result in UI benefit pay 
ments, although certainly a proportion of these cutbacks would be 
eligible.
  If the individual is replaced within the time period over which the 
employment reduction is assessed, then temporary reductions in 
employment would tend to overestimate temporary layoffs.
  The establishment record does not identify an employment change 
caused by the sale of only part of the establishment. The employ 
ment decline within the establishment would be counted as a per 
manent decline, such that the calculation of permanent reductions 
would be overestimated.
  It is not possible to assess whether employment from one quarter 
to the next (or from one month to the next) represents the same 
jobs for the same employees. If this is not the case, permanent 
declines in employment would yield an underestimate of perma 
nent layoffs because some individuals would remain jobless 
although their former positions had been filled.
Measurement of Employment Declines
For the measurement of employment declines, we focus on a rela 
tively narrow definition of temporary layoffs. In the macroeconomic 
literature, in contrast, temporary layoffs may involve longer periods, 
such as a full business cycle. Our approach considers the fact that UI 
creates a special relationship between workers and firms, one that can
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be temporarily broken for up to 26 weeks. For longer layoffs, however, 
the relationship may be permanently severed as workers have no incen 
tive to wait for recall.4 Note that 26 weeks is the typical time period for 
which a worker can collect UI benefits and that the average unemploy 
ment spell currently lasts about 15 weeks.
Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 represent the possible pattern of employ 
ment changes for those firms with reductions in employment. 5 To esti 
mate the amount of permanent and temporary employment reductions, 
the comparisons use A, B, and C as three consecutive points in time. If 
employment in period B is less than employment in period A, then 
period C is used as a reference point to determine the status of the 
employment decline as permanent or temporary. The following algo 
rithm was used:
1. Figure 3.1:
If employment at C is less than or equal to employment at B, then 
the change in employment from A to B is permanent.
2. Figure 3.2:
If employment at C is greater than that at B, but less than that at 
A, then the change from A to C is permanent and from C to B is 
temporary.
3. Figure 3.3:
If employment at C is greater than or equal to employment at A, 
then the change from A to B is temporary.
All temporary and permanent employment reductions per establish 
ment are summed up over the available quarters (or months). The data 
are categorized as to whether the establishments are stable or growing, 
contracting, or bankrupt; by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code; and by size as measured by average employment.
Stable or Growing Establishments Versus Contracting or 
Bankrupt Establishments
The first sample consisted of 101,169 establishments with 20 quar 
ters of continuous employment and also bankrupt establishments. This
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Figure 3.1 Employment Changes: Permanent Change from A to B





Figure 3.2 Employment Changes: Permanent Change from A to C
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Figure 3.3 Employment Changes: Temporary Change from A to B





sample was used to categorize the establishments as (1) stable or grow 
ing, (2) contracting, or (3) bankrupt. To determine whether establish 
ments were stable or growing, or contracting, the log of quarterly 
employment (20 observations) was regressed on a time trend and four 
seasonal dummies (the constant was suppressed). If the coefficient on 
the time trend was negative with a t statistic greater than one, the estab 
lishment was categorized as having declining employment. If, on the 
other hand, the coefficient on the time trend was zero or positive with a 
t statistic greater than or less than one, or negative with a t statistic less 
than one, the establishment was categorized as having stable or grow 
ing employment.
Reductions in employment were calculated using three consecutive 
quarters so that if employment declined between the first and second 
quarters in question, the third quarter was used to assess whether the 
reduction was permanent or temporary. The calculation continued for 
each successive quarter (i.e., second quarter vis-a-vis the third and 
fourth) and summed over 18 quarters. This three-quarter time period
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seems appropriate because UI benefits are available for only 26 weeks. 
If an employer seeks to recall a layoff, it is logical for this to occur 
prior to the exhaustion of benefits.
To ascertain the sensitivity of the analysis to the assumed time 
period, the calculation was repeated using five quarters. Employment 
in the first quarter was compared to that in the third. If employment 
declined in this period, then the fifth quarter was used to determine 
whether the decrease was permanent or temporary. Again, the employ 
ment reductions were summed over the 16 available quarters.
Confirming the work of Murphy and Topel (1987), tables 3.1 and 
3.2 provide summaries showing that (1) more than half of employment 
reductions were permanent in the three categories of establishments 
using both the three-quarter and five-quarter time horizons, and (2) 
there is an increasing percentage of permanent employment reductions 
as the unemployment rate rises. The results for stable or growing estab 
lishments are somewhat sensitive to the choice of time horizon. There 
exists a 14 percentage point difference in the three-quarter and five- 
quarter results as compared to a mere 3 percentage point difference in 
the other two classifications. Regardless, the data reveal that permanent 
employment reductions are consistently more important than tempo 
rary reductions in all categories, particularly for contracting and bank 
rupt establishments, as expected.
Table 3.1 Percentage of Permanent Employment Reductions by Type of 
Establishment (Texas, 1978-1982)
Establishments 












SOURCE: Data sample for 1978-1982 from Texas Employment Commission. 
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per 
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Texas Employment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per 
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100. Calculations 
are based on the data sample used in table 3.1.
The Importance of Permanent Versus Temporary 
Reductions by SIC and Size of Firm
Do employment reductions differ by industry classification or by 
size of establishment? We analyzed the second set of data from the 
Texas Employment Commission records to answer these questions. 
Given the availability of monthly employment figures, six-month and 
nine-month time horizons were utilized.
Some records of individual establishments contained zero monthly 
employment numbers within periods of positive employment. It was 
not known whether the zero job figures were caused by establishment 
closings for those months or by nonreporting of employment to the 
Commission. To overcome this problem, the analysis was carried out 
using three separate methods:
1. The first method assumes that the zero employment numbers 
were caused by establishment closings.
2. If, in the period over which the employment reduction is assessed, 
the change in employment becomes positive again, method 2 
ignores the zero employment figure, assuming it to have been due 
to the nonreporting of data. If employment does not recover in the
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relevant time period, then a permanent decline in employment is 
assumed to have occurred, caused by the establishment closing.
3. Method 3 removes from the analysis those firms with spells of 
zero employment of duration shorter than the time period over 
which the employment reduction is assessed.
For both methods 2 and 3 assume that a brief zero employment spell 
is likely to reflect a reporting error, whereas a lengthy spell is most 
likely attributable to an actual establishment closing.
All three methods were analyzed using a six-month horizon. 
Method 2 was also analyzed using a nine-month horizon to discover 
the sensitivity of the results to the chosen assumptions.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the three methods by industry 
classification. Again, in all classifications, temporary employment 
reductions are far less important than those that are permanent.
The results of methods 1 and 2 are based on all 822,713 establish 
ments, while those of method 3 represent 614,479 establishments (or 
75 percent of the population). Not surprisingly for this time period, 
those classifications with typically stable employment finance, real 
estate, and insurance, and general government have the highest per 
centage of permanent employment reductions. Note that there is very 
little deviation in the results when establishments are analyzed in the 
aggregate. The importance of permanent declines ranges only from 62 
to 64 percent. Within some classifications, however, there are substan 
tial deviations in the results of the three methods. The largest occurs in 
the finance, real estate, and insurance category, where there is an 11 
percentage point differential between the results of method 2 (6 
months) and method 3.
Establishments with fewer than 100 employees account for approxi 
mately 98 percent of all establishments in the study population. Table 
3.4 indicates that these establishments consistently show a lower per 
centage of permanent employment reductions than the other size 
groups. Given the overall percentage of permanent employment 
declines for all establishments in table 3.4 (approximately 62 percent), 
it is clear that the sheer number of smaller establishments conceals the 
high percentage of employment declines in larger establishments.
Table 3.3 Permanent Employment Reductions by Industry Classification (Texas, 1978-1989)
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery
Mining, quarrying, and construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, utilities, and communications
Trade

























































SOURCE: Based on Ul-covered establishment data from 1978 to 1989 from the Texas Employment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of permanent employment reductions divided by total employ 
ment reductions times 100.
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Using method 2 (6 months), the larger establishments exhibit perma 
nent employment reductions of 80 percent, while the smaller establish 
ments exhibit only a 61 percent figure.











































SOURCE: Based on Ul-covered establishment data from 1978 to 1989 from the Texas Employ 
ment Commission.
NOTE: The percentage of permanent employment reductions is calculated as the number of per 
manent employment reductions divided by total employment reductions times 100.
Within size classifications, the largest deviation of 8 percent occurs 
in the smallest classification between methods 1 and 2 (9 months) and 
also between methods 2 (6 months) and 2 (9 months), and, in the 501- 
1,000 classification, between methods 1 and 3 and between methods 2 
(6 months) and 3.6
Concluding Remarks
The determination of the appropriate theoretical model of how the 
costs of unemployment benefits should be optimally allocated hinges 
on the relative importance of insured temporary and permanent layoffs. 
The measure of permanent employment reductions is only a proxy for 
insured permanent layoffs. However, the sheer magnitude of the results 
suggests that, even if insured permanent layoffs represent only half of 
the permanent employment reductions, they are substantial enough not 
to be overlooked.
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NOTES
1. In 1978, employment at firms in the sample was 2,602,410, as compared with total employ 
ment at all firms in Texas of 4,306,277 (see Employment and Training Handbook No. 394, p.476).
2. Note that Murphy and Topel (1987) use information on spells in progress. Thus, some lay 
offs that are counted as temporary could well be permanent, ex post.
3. As an example, suppose that there are 38 temporary layoffs, 52 permanent layoffs, and 10 
quits. With quits included as a permanent decline, the percentage of permanent employment 
declines is 62 percent. If we exclude quits, the calculation is 58 percent (52/90).
4. This special relationship may not be permanently broken when the worker is unable to find 
work elsewhere (i.e. during a major downturn). UI allows for an additional 13 weeks of extended 
benefits.
5. Note that we are only calculating employment declines, rather than increases in employ 
ment.
6. One might conjecture that the lower percentage of permanent employment reductions for 
the smallest establishment size classification could stem from the growth of small establishments. 
Hence, age may be important. The data did not afford the opportunity to classify establishments 
by age.
Funding Reemployment Costs 
When Job Losses are Permanent
Most of the previous theoretical writing on experience rating in 
unemployment insurance (UI) has been concerned with temporary lay 
offs and unemployment. The literature seems to provide no detailed 
theoretical analyses of the role of experience rating in UI when layoffs 
are permanent. 1 Permanent layoffs necessitate the transfer of workers 
from a contracting to another expanding sector (or into nonparticipa- 
tion) and such moves involve costs such as those caused by retraining 
and geographic relocation. Presumably, UI is designed to cover some 
or all of these costs. The question arises as to who should be responsi 
ble for payment of these costs, or, alternatively, how should the system 
be experience rated?
In this chapter, we attempt to answer these questions by analyzing 
how the costs of permanent employment reductions ought to be allo 
cated in order to achieve a specified socially optimal objective. An 
intuitive explanation of the economic model used in the analysis is pre 
sented in the body of the chapter. Alternatively, readers who prefer a 
presentation that also includes a more technical exposition are referred 
to the chapter appendix (which covers the material in the next three 
sections) and then to the concluding section of this chapter.
The general structure of the analysis is described in the remainder of 
this section. In the following section, the socially optimal rate of per 
manent layoffs is derived. The third section provides the analysis of 
permanent layoffs in the framework of market economies using four 
different methods of paying for the costs, i.e., via displaced workers, 
employers in the contracting sector, employers in the expanding sector, 
and the government. The consequences of the four assumptions are 
then determined. In the fourth section, the theoretical framework is 
made more realistic by introducing an explicit "waiting," "queuing," or 
"training" period through which laid-off workers must pass before they 
can relocate to another job. This period lengthens as total layoffs 
increase. Our findings are summarized in the final section.
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In order to focus on the essential issue, the basic structure of the 
analysis is quite simple. There are only two sectors (or industries): one 
produces output X, and the other produces output Y. Labor is the only 
factor of production, and the total labor supply in the economy is fixed, 
although labor can move between the two sectors. In much of the anal 
ysis, there is no explicit unemployment, so that the sum of employment 
in both sectors equals total employment.
Initially, this economy is in equilibrium, in the sense that a unit of 
labor generates the same marginal utility (that is, the same additional 
value or well-being) for the representative consumer in either industry 
X or industry Y. Suppose, however, that this initial equilibrium is dis 
turbed by a change in tastes towards good Y, which raises its marginal 
utility. As a result, consumers want more of good Y and less of good X.
To satisfy this new preference, a shift of workers from the produc 
tion of good X to the production of good Y is required. However, mov 
ing these workers is not costless. If it were, the flow of workers to the Y 
sector would take place instantaneously. The costs of adjustment are 
associated with such factors as unemployment compensation, search 
ing for a new job, retraining, and geographic relocation, and are 
incurred by the former employer, the employee, the government, or the 
new employer. Unemployment compensation constitutes a substantial 
proportion of these costs. The faster the flow of labor from sector X to 
sector y, the higher are both the total and marginal costs of the employ 
ment adjustment. This basic model of an economy sets the stage for the 
analysis that follows.
The Socially Optimal Rate of Permanent Layoffs
We now assume that there is a benevolent dictator who seeks to 
maximize the representative consumer©s utility but recognizes that 
there are adjustment costs. The dictator is responsible for moving labor 
from sector X to sector y at a socially optimal rate. That is, the benevo 
lent dictator wishes to maximize the utility derived from the consump 
tion of X and Y, adjusted for the costs of transferring labor from sector 
X to sector y Since the adjustment takes time, it is the present value of
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present and future net utilities, not the instantaneous level of net utility, 
that should be maximized.
The economy is in equilibrium initially, but, with the change in 
tastes, a marginal unit of labor now generates more utility in sector Y 
than in sector X. In the presence of adjustment costs, how fast should 
the benevolent dictator shift labor from sector X to sector F?
The marginal cost of shifting an extra unit of labor from sector X to 
sector Y is equal to the marginal adjustment cost. The marginal benefit 
of moving this unit of labor is the excess of the extra utility gained 
from its employment in industry Y over the utility lost in industry X. As 
more of good Y is produced, its marginal utility declines, and as less of 
good X is produced, its marginal utility rises. In other words, the con 
sumer places less value on the consumption of additional units of a 
particular good. Thus, the marginal benefit of increasing employment 
in sector Y declines as more and more labor is moved from sector X to 
sector Y.
Since labor is moved gradually, this net benefit accrues not only in 
one period but over all periods until the new equilibrium is reached. 
The future benefits must be discounted at the social rate of discount 
and then summed over all periods. For the dictator©s actions to be 
socially optimal, the present value of the net marginal benefits of mov 
ing one unit of labor must be equal to the marginal adjustment costs.
The optimal rate of adjustment of employment in sectors X and Y is 
rapid at first but then slows down until the new long-run equilibrium is 
reached. This is so because initially, as labor is shifted from industry X 
to industry Y, the net benefit derived from transferring labor is high, and 
thus the flow of labor is high. As the marginal benefit of the labor trans 
fer declines, the flow of labor also declines.
Adjustment Paths in Market Economies
Let us now postulate the existence of output, labor, and capital mar 
kets and examine how adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium 
would take place. Four versions of the competitive model are analyzed. 
They differ in the assumptions about which agents are responsible for 
the payment of the adjustment costs. In case A, the workers who move
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from industry X to industry Y have to pay for these costs. In case B, the 
employers in the contracting industry X bear the payment responsibil 
ity. In case C, the employers in the expanding sector Y are required to 
pay for the costs of moving labor. Finally, in case D, a third party, such 
as the government, pays the adjustment costs but does not actually con 
trol the movement of labor from industry X to industry K
Case A: Displaced Workers Pay the Adjustment Costs
In a perfectly competitive market, employees are paid the value of 
their marginal product; that is, the wage is equal to the price of the 
product times the marginal product of the last worker hired. For exam 
ple, if good 7 sells for $5 and the last worker hired produces three units 
of 7 in an hour, the wage in industry Y is equal to $15 an hour. Of 
course, the marginal product of all previous workers hired is higher 
than that of the last worker because of diminishing marginal productiv 
ity of labor.
Since labor is assumed to be homogeneous, long-run equilibrium 
requires that the wage in the X industry be equal to the wage in the Y 
industry. In other words, there is no incentive for workers to move from 
one sector to the other.
As before, the economy©s initial equilibrium is disturbed by a shift 
in tastes, which raises the marginal utility of good Y. In competitive 
markets, the price of good X and the wage in industry X fall in relation 
to those in industry Y, so that now wages in industry Y are higher. With 
no adjustment costs, labor would move immediately from sector X to 
sector Y, which would reestablish the equality of the two wage rates. 
With adjustment costs, however, workers in industry X face two 
options. They may stay in that sector and receive a relatively low 
income stream. Alternatively, these workers may move to industry y 
and, for some time, receive a relatively high income stream.
Workers, however, cannot obtain the high income stream of industry 
y without paying the costs of moving. Let the price of moving be equal 
to the marginal adjustment cost. Thus, an individual worker will move 
when total earnings in industry Y (properly discounted) exceed total 
earnings in industry X by more than the cost of moving. The optimal 
rate of movement is obtained when the marginal worker is indifferent 
between staying in one sector and moving to the other. It can be shown
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that the conditions for the optimal transfer of labor from sector X to 
sector Y under a benevolent dictator and under the present competitive 
conditions, respectively, are equivalent. (See the chapter appendix for 
the formal proof.)
Having established that the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y is 
socially optimal, under the assumed circumstances, now consider what 
happens to the incomes of workers and employers. First, all initial 
employees in sector X lose income in relation to the income earned by 
employees in sector Y. This loss is equal to the (properly discounted) 
difference between the wages in the two industries. Employees who 
remain in sector X receive the lower wage, and employees who move to 
sector Y receive the higher wage but must pay the adjustment cost. 
After proper discounting, the adjustment cost is just equal to the 
remaining difference between the wage in industry Y and the wage in 
industry X in the long run.
Second, what happens to nonlabor incomes in industry XI The rep 
resentative firm©s gross revenue per employee is equal to the price of 
good X times the average product of labor (average output produced 
per worker). Since the firm©s wage per employee is equal to the price of 
X times the marginal product of labor, the firm©s total nonlabor income 
(per employee) in any one year is equal to the price of good X times the 
difference between the average product and marginal product of labor.
In accordance with the theory of the firm, let us assume that
1. the average product of labor is greater than or equal to the mar 
ginal product of labor,
2. both the average product of labor and the marginal product of 
labor are falling as employment in industry X rises, and
3. the marginal product of labor falls faster than the average product 
of labor, resulting in an increase in the difference between the 
average product and marginal product as employment in sector X 
rises.
Initially, the relative price of X falls, and thus nonlabor income must 
fall. Afterwards, however, employment in sector X falls, the price of X 
rises, and the difference between the average and marginal product of 
labor falls, which means that nonlabor income may increase or 
decrease. The precise path of nonlabor income depends on the parame-
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ter values of the production and utility functions. However, it seems 
reasonable and realistic to assume that the net present value of the 
change in nonlabor income during the entire adjustment period is nega 
tive.
The third dimension is the income of workers in sector Y. Initially, 
employment in the industry rises, and so the marginal productivity of 
labor declines. This means that the real wage falls. It need not, how 
ever, fall in terms of the real purchasing power of both X and Y. 
Employees initially in sector Y enjoy a higher income during the 
adjustment period than do those in sector X.
Finally, consider the industry©s nonlabor income, which is given by 
the difference between the average and marginal products of labor in 
sector Y times employment in this sector. Initially, employment in the 
industry begins to rise, which, in turn, raises the difference between the 
average and marginal products of labor. Hence, nonlabor income must 
rise.
The discussion in this section thus far has been based on the 
assumption that wages in industry X are flexible. Since wage and price 
stickiness seems to be quite common in many actual economies, we 
will address briefly what might happen when the wage in sector X 
remains at its original level, while the value of the marginal product 
falls initially. Profit maximization by employers in industry X would 
require the layoff of some employees, in order for the value of the mar 
ginal product to equal that initial sticky wage. This means that output 
of X falls and that both the price of good X and the marginal product of 
labor in this industry rise. In contrast to the previous adjustments, how 
ever, employment and output in sector Y do not increase.
Unemployed workers in industry X now evaluate two alternatives. 
First, they may search for a job in their industry and, if successful, dis 
place another employee and earn the initial wage. Second, they may 
pay the adjustment costs, relocate to sector Y and earn the wage there. 
If unemployed workers maximize their net expected incomes, they will 
be indifferent between remaining in sector X and moving to sector Y 
when the marginal adjustment costs equal the net present value of the 
difference between the wage in industry Y minus the product of the 
wage in industry X and the probability that the unemployed worker can 
find a job in industry X. This condition is not identical to that of the 
benevolent dictator. In particular, it has often been suggested that laid-
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off employees may be overly optimistic about finding a job in their 
own sector, especially when many layoffs are temporary. This would 
result in an overestimate of the probability of finding a job in industry 
X, which, in turn, would imply a suboptimal flow of labor to the other 
sector.
There is another reason why this flow of labor may be suboptimal in 
case A. It is very likely that unemployed workers face imperfect capital 
markets so that, for instance, they may not be able to borrow funds to 
finance the adjustment costs. In that situation, the movement of work 
ers from sector X to sector Y would be lower than the socially optimal 
flow. (The appendix provides a more rigorous discussion of this point.)
Case B: Employers in the Contracting Industry 
Bear the Adjustment Costs
We now turn to a different regime of paying for the adjustment 
costs. In particular, by law or by custom, the employers in the contract 
ing sector X are fully responsible for this payment for all employees 
who separate from the sector.
An employer in this industry faces the situation in which, initially, 
the price of X falls, so that the value of the marginal product of labor 
also falls. If the wage does not decline by an equal amount, the 
employer lays off workers. However, the employer now has to pay the 
costs of moving labor to sector Y. Hence, the layoff decision is deter 
mined not only by the difference between the value of the marginal 
product and the wage, but also by the adjustment costs. Specifically, a 
profit-maximizing employer will lay off a marginal worker when the 
associated present and future labor cost savings exceed the marginal 
adjustment costs.
What is the level of the wage rate in industry XI Since firms in this 
sector are responsible for the adjustment costs of all workers who 
move (whether due to layoffs or to voluntary quits), the wage tends to 
equality with the wage paid in sector Y. To see why this is so, consider 
the circumstance in which initially the wage in industry X is less than 
the wage in industry Y. All employees in sector X then wish to be 
moved because they can earn a higher wage in the other industry and 
all costs of moving are paid by firms in sector X. This, however, would 
entail great total adjustment costs for employers in sector X, who are,
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therefore, induced to maintain their wages at the level of the Y sector. 
In that case, employees in industry X are indifferent between (1) stay 
ing, and (2) being laid off and moving to industry Y.
Firms in sector X initiate layoffs and transfers of labor to sector Y. 
Thus, the system is in equilibrium when the rate of layoffs implies 
marginal adjustment costs equal to the present value of the difference 
between the value of the marginal product (wage) in sector Y and the 
value of the marginal product of labor (which is less than the wage) in 
sector X. This is the same socially optimal rate of flow of labor from 
sector X to sector Y that occurred with the benevolent dictator.
The marginal product of labor in sector Y determines both indus 
tries© wages. As labor flows from sector X to sector Y, the marginal 
product of labor in sector Y and wages in both sectors gradually fall 
until the new long-run level of wages is attained.
What are the implications of case B for the distribution of income? 
Since workers in both industries receive identical real wages, there is 
no change in the relative distribution of wage incomes. Compared with 
case A, however, workers in industry X receive a higher real wage and 
workers in industry Y receive the same real wage.
Firms in sector X must now pay the adjustment costs. However, 
compared with case A, there are further costs. Nonlabor income in 
industry X is reduced: first, employers must pay the adjustment costs, 
and, second, employers must continue to pay the relatively high wage 
of industry Y despite the decline in the value of labor©s marginal prod 
uct in industry X. With employers in sector X paying for the adjustment 
costs, nonlabor incomes in sector Y tend to rise, as in case A.
Case C: Employers in the Expanding Industry 
Bear the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, by custom or law, employers in the expanding sec 
tor Y are obliged to bear the costs of transferring labor to their industry. 
As before, the marginal utility of Y rises initially. Firms in the expand 
ing sector hire workers in sector X at the industry Y wage, pay the mov 
ing costs, and then employ this labor. Employers will engage in this 
practice as long as the marginal adjustment cost is less than the present 
value of the difference between the value of the marginal product and 
the wage in industry Y.
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What is the wage for workers who have moved from sector X and 
are now working in sector Yl Competition among the employers in sec 
tor Y ensures that wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor 
in that industry, no matter where the workers originated or who paid 
the adjustment costs. It is only under imperfectly competitive condi 
tions that the wage of the newly hired workers in industry Y may fall 
short of marginal productivity. For instance, it may be possible that 
employers in sector Y can contractually bind individuals from sector X 
to work at a wage less than marginal productivity, in return for the 
employers© paying the moving costs. However, such indenture con 
tracts are rarely enforceable in courts of law.
Since the wage in industry Y for the newly hired workers is likely to 
exceed the value of the marginal product in industry X and may well be 
equal to the value of the marginal product in industry Y, we conclude 
that the equilibrium condition is typically not the same as the socially 
optimal condition. Specifically, the adjustment rate is less than the 
socially optimal one. When employers in sector Y behave competitively 
in the labor market, the profit-maximizing flow of labor from one sec 
tor to the other is zero. In other words, when employers in sector Y 
must pay their transferred workers the full value of the marginal prod 
uct in sector Y in addition to the adjustment costs, they have no motive 
for hiring them and no labor will be transferred.
It may be worth noting that regulations requiring employers in the 
expanding sector to pay for the adjustment costs cannot be imple 
mented easily. It is hard to identify employees who have moved from 
contracting sectors. Further, a tax or charge on new hires would have 
undesirable, negative incentive effects.
Case D: Government Bears the Adjustment Costs
In the last three subsections, we have examined situations in which 
the adjustment costs are internalized to employers or employees who 
also control the rate of flow of labor. We now postulate crucially differ 
ent circumstances, whereby the government, without direct control 
over the number of layoffs, pays the adjustment costs for any worker 
who has been laid off permanently in sector X. The adjustment costs 
are paid from general revenues, which, in turn, are financed by general
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taxes or by borrowing. None of these taxes, however, is linked directly 
to employers© or employees© layoff, hiring, or moving decisions.
As before, the marginal utility of good Y rises, leading to a decline in 
the relative price of good X and in the value of the marginal product of 
labor in X. The wage in sector X, however, remains equal to the wage in 
sector Y. Layoffs are costless to employers in sector X; thus, workers 
are laid off immediately, maintaining the equality of the value of the 
marginal products in both sectors. The government pays, more or less 
immediately, the adjustment costs for all layoffs and requires that 
workers relocate to the other sector. The new equilibrium is achieved 
virtually instantaneously. Given our basic assumption of rising mar 
ginal adjustment costs, this instantaneous adjustment would be nonop- 
timally fast and very costly. Alternatively, if the government somehow 
were to ration the payments of the adjustment costs, structural unem 
ployment would likely result.
From Theory to Practice
The theoretical framework of the previous sections is now modified 
in order to approximate current UI practices. In all states, qualified 
workers receive weekly unemployment benefits for the period of their 
joblessness (subject to a maximum duration of normally 26 weeks). In 
the preceding theoretical approach, by contrast, unemployment is ruled 
out, for the most part, because workers are transferred to sector Y 
immediately upon layoff and/or payment of the marginal adjustment 
cost. In order to account for unemployment explicitly, we now postu 
late that the relocation process consists of a time of joblessness during 
which employees, who have left sector X, search for or wait for work in 
sector Y. The length of this unemployment period cannot be influenced 
by individual workers, but it lengthens with the total number of work 
ers who leave the contracting sector.
Consider again case A, in which laid-off employees bear the costs of 
unemployment as well as any additional financial costs of moving from 
sector X to sector Y. Further, wages in both industries are fully flexible 
and adjust to their respective marginal products at all times. Employees 
in sector X have the choice of (1) remaining in the sector and receiving
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that wage, or (2) leaving the sector, waiting for a period of D, and then 
receiving the wage in sector Y minus the cost of transferring between 
industries.
If, initially, the switch to sector Y yields a higher net present value of 
future earnings minus the adjustment costs than staying in sector X, 
individual workers will move. As more and more do so, the unemploy 
ment duration and the additional adjustment costs rise. The earnings 
stream in sector Y is postponed, and thus the net present value of these 
earnings falls. The costs of adjustment rise until the equilibrium rate of 
transfer is reached; this occurs when individual workers are indifferent 
between staying in or leaving sector X.
The marginal adjustment costs are now the sum of the net present 
value of the wages foregone in sector Y because of the waiting period 
and any additional financial adjustment costs. In this case, the equilib 
rium rate of transfer of labor is identical to that of the socially optimal 
rate.
A UI system is now introduced in which unemployment benefits are 
paid to laid-off workers and are usually charged partially to the recipi 
ents© previous employers in sector X. In the theory of case B in the pre 
ceding section, the firms in the contracting sector are directly 
responsible for both the implementation and the costs of relocation. In 
practice, however, employers only make layoff decisions, and, with the 
present assumptions, laid-off employees relocate to a new job after a 
waiting or searching period and paying an additional financial adjust 
ment cost. While on layoff, up to a maximum duration, workers receive 
weekly unemployment benefits. Does the current experience-rating 
system induce firms to lay off workers (permanently) at a rate equal to 
the socially optimal rate of transfer?
The firm©s layoff decision can be presented formally as follows. 
Usually, firms are required to pay only some proportion of the UI ben 
efits received by their laid-off workers. Thus, only a fraction of the 
present value of the benefits received by the laid-off worker represents 
the marginal tax costs of layoffs to the typical firm in the declining sec 
tor.
The marginal benefits from layoffs that accrue to the firm are the net 
present value of the difference between the wage and the value of the 
marginal product. The firm lays off workers as long as the marginal tax 
costs of layoffs are less than their marginal benefits. As the layoffs of
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the representative firm and thus total layoffs increase, there is an 
increase in unemployment duration and consequently in the present 
value of the UI benefits received by the laid-off workers. With a par 
tially experience-rated tax rate, the firm©s marginal tax costs of layoffs 
will, therefore, rise. The firm©s optimal layoffs occur when these mar 
ginal tax costs are just equal to the marginal benefits of layoffs.
To understand whether the firm©s optimal layoff is also the socially 
optimal one, the wage rate in sector X needs to be ascertained. This 
determination is made in the framework of two alternative assump 
tions. First, it is assumed that markets are perfect, so that wages in sec 
tor X are flexible. The second approach is to assume that wages in 
sector X are inflexible and are equal to wages in sector Y.
When the wage rates in industry X are flexible, their present value 
must be determined by the equality of the properly discounted income 
streams in sectors X and Y. In particular, the present value of wages in 
industry X must equal the present value of earnings in industry Y (after 
the period of unemployment), plus the unemployment benefits, less the 
financial costs of transferring to industry Y.
What determines the layoff rate of the employer? In this case, the 
employer does not pay the full cost of the UI benefits, but only a frac 
tion thereof, and the unemployment benefits are less than the wage in 
sector Y (typically, benefits are 40 to 60 percent of wages). The result 
ing layoff rate will be higher than the socially optimal rate because the 
latter imposes the full adjustment cost on the employer. Thus, imper 
fect experience rating leads to higher-than-optimal layoffs by firms, 
resulting in higher-than-optimal levels of unemployment. Increases in 
the degree of experience rating would reduce the firm©s layoff rate and 
bring it closer to the socially optimal one.
Under the second set of conditions, the relative wages in sector X are 
inflexible and are equal to the wages in sector Y. With the current 
assumptions, the optimal transfer of labor from industry X to industry Y 
requires that the present value of the proportion of unemployment ben 
efits paid by the employer be equal to the present value of the wage in 
sector Y from the time of layoff to the time of hire in that sector plus 
any additional costs of transfer. The profit-maximizing layoff decision 
leads to layoffs and an unemployment duration that are in excess of 
what is socially optimal. Socially optimal layoffs and unemployment 
duration may be achieved by raising the proportion of benefits charged
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to the employer or by raising unemployment benefits. For that purpose, 
the increase in benefits need not actually be paid to the unemployed 
workers. Its function is to raise the marginal costs of layoffs, so that the 
rate of layoffs and therefore the duration and level of unemployment 
are reduced toward their social optima.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, the role of experience rating in UI has been reexam- 
ined in the context of permanent layoffs. Previous investigations have 
been largely confined to temporary layoffs. Our main findings are as 
follows:
1. Socially optimal rates of labor transfer from contracting to 
expanding sectors can be achieved by charging the costs of trans 
fer either to the (permanently) laid-off workers or to the employ 
ers in the contracting sector. Charging laid-off workers, however, 
requires fully flexible wages and perfect capital markets. When 
wages are sticky, charging employers may still achieve an opti 
mal outcome.
2. Whoever is responsible for paying the transfer costs will suffer a 
loss of income (at least, in the short run).
3. Charging the transfer costs to employers in the expanding sec- 
tor(s) would be socially optimal only if extremely complicated 
rules could be enforced. Consequently, we rule out this alterna 
tive.
4. Financing the transfer costs partially or wholly by a general tax 
would lead to nonoptimally high transfers or to high structural 
unemployment.
5. When wages are inflexible, employers are charged and experience 
rated imperfectly and the unemployment benefits fall short of 
wages. Then permanent layoffs tend to be larger than optimal. To 
achieve the optimal outcome in these cases, employer charges 
should be increased, even though they may exceed benefits.
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Our general conclusion is that "full" experience rating is a highly 
desirable UI property for permanent, as well as for temporary, layoffs. 
Indeed, in some circumstances, the system ought to be "more than 
fully" experience rated to achieve the socially optimal adjustment. In 
practice, however, the goal of socially optimal transfers will, as always, 
be balanced against considerations of equity, that is, can the declining 
sector afford a higher UI tax?
NOTES
l.As mentioned previosly, temporary layoffs are here defined as employment separations that 
are reversed by recalls or new hires after a relatively short period of time. Temporary, unlike per 
manent, layoffs do not lead to long-run reductions in the employer©s workforce. Typical examples 
of the literature on temporary layoffs are Feldstein (1976), Wolcowitz (1984), and Cook (1992).
Appendix to Chapter 4 
The Formal Two-Sector Model
The following sections mirror those in the body of the chapter but offer a 
formal presentation of the theoretical framework.
In this model, we assume initially that there is no explicit unemployment so 
that
where N is the total labor force and Nx and Ny stand for employment in sectors 
X and Y. The production functions in the two sectors are given by
Y=h(Ny) = h(N-Nx).
The marginal products of labor in the two sectors, MPX(= g©) and MPy(= h©), 
are positive and declining, that is, 
g© > 0, g" < 0, and 
K > 0, h" < 0. 
There is a representative consumer with a utility function,
U(X, Y).
The marginal utilities of goods X and Y, MUX(= Ux) and MUy(= Uy), are pos 
itive and declining, that is, 
Ux > 0, Uxx < 0, and 
Uy >Q, Uyy <0.
It is also convenient to assume that the marginal utility of X rises with the 
consumption of Y and vice versa, that is,
^y>0.
When employed in sector X, a unit of labor generates a marginal utility of 
MUX MPX, when employed in sector Y, a unit of labor generates a marginal util 
ity ofMUy MPy. Thus, the equilibrium condition is MUX MPX = MUy MPy. This 
condition can be derived formally by maximizing the utility function subject to 
the stated constraints:
Max U(X, Y) 
subject to
X = g(Nx), Y = h(Ny) and Nx + Ny = N.
The initial equilibrium can be illustrated by means of a simple diagram. 
Figure 4.1 includes a production possibilities curve (PPC) and an indifference 
curve (/!), which is derived from the utility function of the representative con 
sumer. Maximum utility is achieved at the point of tangency (E^) of the two 
curves. This point is defined by the equality of the slope of the indifference 
curve, namely MUX /MUy, and the slope of the production possibilities curve, 
MPx IMPy.
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The initial equilibrium (f^) is disturbed by an exogenous change in tastes, 
for example, which raises the marginal utility of Y. As a result, the new indif 
ference curve is /2, and the new long-run equilibrium is E^, with increased lev 
els of Y and Ny and reduced levels of X and Nx.
Figure 4.1 Equilibrium in the Two-Sector Model
If the movement from E\ to £2 were costless, then the economy would shift 
to EI instantaneously. In the present model, however, there are adjustment 
costs that prevent an immediate adjustment. Unemployment compensation 
constitutes a substantial proportion of these adjustment costs in the case of per 
manent layoffs.
There is a flow of labor ( N ) from sector X to sector Y. It is plausible that 
faster adjustment involves both higher total and higher marginal costs of ad 
justment. Consequently, we assume that the adjustment cost function is similar 
to that in figure 4.2. When adjustment is zero, both total and marginal adjust 
ment costs are zero. As the rate of adjustment increases, both the height and the 
slope of the function rise. Formally, the properties of the adjustment cost func 
tion are stated as follows:
/(A>)>0forall A> >0 
when/©(A/) > 0, /" (A>) > 0 and 
when/(0) = 0, /©(0) = 0.
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Figure 4.2 The Adjustment Cost Function
Adjustment 
costs f(N) Adjustment cost function
Flow of labor from X to Y
This type of adjustment cost is likely to cause a gradual adjustment from EI 
to #2, because instantaneous adjustment would be prohibitively expensive.
The Socially Optimal Rate of Permanent Layoffs
We now assume that there is a benevolent dictator who wishes to maximize 
the utility of a representative consumer while recognizing the existence of ad 
justment costs. The appropriate maximization problem can be stated formally 
as the exponential function:
(4.1) MaxV, = J [I/(Xr rt)-
-P(T-0
subject to: X = g(Nx) 
Y = h(Ny)
N = Nx+Ny.
The letter p stands for the social rate of discount, the adjustment costs/(N) are 
measured in the same units as utility, and e (= 2.71828) represents the discount 
function. Throughout this appendix, the following notation with respect to time 
indexes is maintained. A change in tastes (or technology) occurs at time f0 - The 
subscript t refers to any period including and subsequent to f0 and the subscript 
T refers to any period including and subsequent to t. In symbols, t0 < t < 1 < oo. 1 
The preceding objective function states that the benevolent dictator wishes to 
maximize the utility derived from the consumption of X and Y, adjusted for the 
costs of transferring labor from sector X to sector Y. Since the adjustment takes 
time, it is the present value of present and future net utilities that should be
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maximized, not the instantaneous level of net utility. This present value is rep 
resented by Vt in equation (4.1).
Initially, the economy is in equilibrium at point E  in figure 4.1. As men 
tioned, in this initial equilibrium MUX MPX = MUy MPy (or Ux g© = Uy h©) and 
f (N ) = 0 because W = 0. At time ?Q, there is a shift in tastes (or production 
technology) so that now MUy MPy > MUX MPX. In other words, a marginal unit 
of labor now generates more utility in sector Y than in sector X. In the presence 
of adjustment costs, how fast should the benevolent dictator shift labor from 
sector X to sector F?
This maximization problem can be solved mathematically by standard tech 
niques of optimal control theory. We favor the following slightly less formal 
and more heuristic solution. The marginal cost of shifting an extra unit of labor 
from sector X to sector Y is equal to the marginal adjustment cost, namely 
f (N). The marginal benefit of moving this unit of labor is the extra utility 
gained from its employment in industry Y minus the utility lost in industry X. 
In any one period, this excess is measured by (MUy MPy - MUX MPX) or, equiv- 
alently by (Uy h© - Ux g©). Since labor is moved gradually, this net benefit ac 
crues not only in one period but over all periods until the new equilibrium (£2 
in figure 4.1) is reached. The future benefits must be discounted at the social 
rate of discount p and then summed. For the dictator©s actions to be socially op 
timal, the present value of the net marginal benefits of moving one unit of labor 
must be equal to the marginal adjustment costs. Formally, this condition can be 
stated as
(4.2) f©(Nt) =
which must hold for all time periods after and including f0, that is, for t > fy. 
When this condition is differentiated with respect to time, the so-called Euler 
equation of the calculus of variations is obtained.
The optimal rate of adjustment of employment in sectors X and Y to the new 
equilibrium is illustrated in figure 4.3. Initially, Nx is relatively high, and A^ is 
relatively low. At f0 , the change in tastes occurs, and the benevolent dictator 
allocates labor according to equation (4.2). As illustrated in figure 4.3, the ad 
justment is rapid at first but then slows down until the new steady state is 
reached at t*. As labor is shifted from sector X to sector Y, the marginal product 
of labor rises in sector X and falls in sector Y. Similarly, the marginal utility of 
X rises and that of Y falls. In other words, as labor is moved from X to Y, MUX 
MPX rises and MUy MPy falls until, in the new steady state, they are again equal. 
Initially, the net benefit derived from transferring labor is high, and hence N 
is high. As (MUy MPy - MUX MPX) declines, the flow of labor also declines.
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Adjustment Paths in Market Economies
Here we include output, labor, and capital markets to examine how adjust 
ment to the new steady state would take place. Four versions of the competitive 
model are studied; these are based on different assumptions about which agents 
are responsible for the payment of the adjustment costs.
In market models, prices (Px and Py) and wages (wx and wy) play an impor 
tant role. For convenience, let Py be the numeraire, so that Py = 1. Hence, fac 
tors such as wages, incomes, and adjustment costs are all measured in units of 
Y. The representative consumer maximizes his/her utility subject to a budget 
constraint. This implies the equality of the marginal rate of substitution with 
the price ratio, or
(4.3) MU/MUy = Px
Equation (4.3) is assumed to hold in all four versions of the market model, both 
during the adjustment periods and in the steady states.
Case A: Displaced Workers Pay the Adjustment Costs
To begin, we postulate a perfectly competitive version of the model, such 
that employees are paid the values of their marginal products:
wx = PX MPX and wy = MPy.
These two conditions are satisfied both during the adjustment period and in 
steady states.
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Since labor is assumed to be homogeneous, steady state equilibrium re 
quires that wx = Wy or Px MPX = MPy. After substituting for Px from equation 
(4.3), we obtain
MUy /MUx = MPx /MPy, 
which is the tangency condition illustrated in figure 4.1.
As before, the economy©s initial equilibrium is disturbed at time f0 by a shift 
in tastes, which raises MUy. In competitive markets, Px and wx fall relative to 
Py and wy, so that now, wy > wx. With no adjustment costs, labor would move 
immediately from sector X to sector Y which would reestablish the equality of 
the two wage rates. Wage maximizing behavior by employees would establish 
the new equilibrium instantaneously at £2 in figure 4.1. With adjustment costs, 
however, workers in industry X face two options. They may stay in their indus 
try and receive a relatively low income stream, which has a present value of
(4.4) NPV = r --r(T ~ r) 
v © xt
where r stands for a representative rate of interest at which future earnings are 
discounted. Alternatively, the workers in industry X may move to industry Y 
and receive a relatively high income stream, which has a present value of
(4.5) NPV , =yt
The workers cannot, however, obtain NPVyt without paying the costs of 
moving to industry Y. Let the price of moving be equal to the marginal adjust 
ment cost. The individual worker will move if
(4.6) [NPVyt -V(N)] ^NPVxt
where ty©(N) stands for the marginal adjustment cost, measured in units of Y. 
Thus, an individual worker will move to industry Y when total earnings in that 
sector (properly discounted) exceed total earnings in industry X by more than 
the cost of moving. The optimal rate of movement is obtained when the mar 
ginal worker is indifferent between staying in industry X and moving to indus 
try Y, that is, when
(A 7^ *ki / Vr \ _ I /... ... \ ~~r *• "~ '
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or, since wages are equal to the values of their marginal products:
(4.7©) <>© (,)= (MP - Px% MPXT ) e~r (T ©   rfu
Equations (4.2) and (4.7©), which present the conditions for the optimal transfer 
of labor from sector X to sector Y under a benevolent dictator and under com 
petitive conditions can be shown to be equivalent. First, substitute MUX IMUy 
for Px in equation (4.7©) and second, multiply the entire equation by MUy. Then 
the left-hand side of the resulting equation is MUy ty©(Nt ). Since ty©(Nt ) is the 
marginal adjustment cost measured in units of Y, while /© (Nt ) is the same cost 
measured in utility units, it follows that
f(Nt) = MUyV(fi).
The only remaining difference between equations (4.2) and (4.7©) is the rate of 
discount. In equation (4.2), it is p, the social rate of discount, while in equation 
(4.7©), it is r, the representative market rate of interest. If all markets, and in par 
ticular the capital market, are perfectly competitive, then the representative 
market rate of interest equals the social rate of discount. Thus, equations (4.2) 
and (4.7©) are indeed equivalent and yield the same optimal rate of transfer of 
labor from sector X to sector Y.
The optimal paths of labor in industry X and industry Y under competitive 
conditions are the same as those under the benevolent dictator and have already 
been illustrated in figure 4.3. Figure 4.4 illustrates the corresponding move 
ment of wages in the two industries. The change in tastes at time f0 reduces Px 
relative to Py and, hence, wx falls relative to wy. Thereafter, as labor flows from 
sector X to sector Y, output of X falls and output of Y rises, MPX rises and MPy 
falls, MUX rises and MUy falls, and Px rises relative to Py(= 1). This means that 
wx rises and wy falls until the new long-run equilibrium is established at time t* 
at which wx = ny
Having determined that the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y (that is, 
N) is socially optimal under the assumed circumstances, we now consider 
what happens to the incomes of workers and employers. First, all initial em 
ployees in sector X lose income in relation to that earned by employees in sec 
tor Y. This loss is equal to the (properly discounted) area between the upper wy 
line and the lower wx line in figure 4.4. Employees who remain in industry X 
receive the lower wage wx, and employees who move to industry Y receive the 
higher wage wy but must pay the adjustment cost, which, after proper discount 
ing, is just equal to the remaining difference between wy and wx. Thus, com-
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pared to workers in sector Y, each employee who is in sector X at IQ suffers an 
income loss between f0 and t*, which, in net present value terms, is equal to
(4.8) Workers© loss^.= I
-r(l-tQ )
di
Second, what happens to nonlabor incomes in sector XI The representative 
firm©s gross revenue per employee is PX APX, where APX stands for the average 
product of labor. Since the wage per employee is Px MPX, the firm©s total non- 
labor income in any one year is Px (APX - MPX) Nx. 2 In accordance with the 
standard theory of the firm, we assume that, over the relevant range of A^
1.APX >MPX
2. both APX and MPX are falling with A^
3. MPX falls faster than APX 
so that (APX - MPX) rises with A^.
At time t0 , the relative price of X (that is, Px) falls, and, so nonlabor income 
must fall. After f0 , however, Nx falls (see figure 4.3); hence Px rises, and (APX 
- MPX) falls, which means that nonlabor income may rise or fall. As discussed 
in chapter 4, we find it reasonable to assume that the net present value of the 
change in nonlabor income during the entire adjustment period is negative, al 
though the parameter values of the production and utility functions determine 
the exact path of nonlabor income.






The third dimension is the income of workers in sector Y. Here the wage is 
Py MPy per employee per period, where, as before, Py = 1 (the numeraire).
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Starting at r0, Ny rises and thus MPy declines. This means that the real wage, 
measured in terms of good Y, falls. However, it need not fall in terms of the real 
purchasing power over goods from both sector X and sector Y. The path of wy 
in figure 4.4 shows that those employees who are in sector Y at time t0 enjoy a 
higher income during the adjustment period than do those in sector X.
Finally, consider nonlabor income in sector Y, which is given by (APy - 
MPy)Ny. Let us assume, as before, that APy > MPy and that (APy - MPy) rises 
with increases in Ny. At time t0 , Ny begins to rise, which, in turn, raises (APy - 
MPy). Hence, nonlabor income (measured in terms of Y) must rise.
The discussion in this section has so far been based on the assumption that 
wages in industry X are flexible, in the sense that they are always equal to Px 
MPX . Since wage and price stickiness seems to be quite common in many actual 
economies, we will address briefly what might happen when the wage in sector 
X remains at its initial level (w *) while the value of the marginal product falls 
at tQ. Profit maximization by employers in industry X would require that AA^ 
employees be laid off, so that the equality of w * and Px MPX can be main 
tained. This means that output of industry X falls and that both Px and MPX rise. 
In contrast to the previous adjustments, however, employment and output in in 
dustry Y do not increase.
Unemployed workers in industry X now consider two alternatives. First, 
they may search for a job in that sector, and, if successful, displace another em 
ployee and earn wx. Second, they may pay the adjustment costs, relocate to in 
dustry Y, and earn wy (= MPy}. Let Pr be the probability that an unemployed 
worker can find a job in sector X. If unemployed workers maximize their net 
expected incomes, they will be indifferent between remaining in sector X and 
moving to sector Y when
(A Q\ At i \~T\ I i/r n _ ^ */ f * -r(T-0 jjwxe dl
This condition is not identical to those in equations (4.2) and (4.7©). In particu 
lar, it has often been suggested that laid-off employees in industry X may be 
overly optimistic about finding a job in the sector, especially when many lay 
offs are temporary. This would result in an overestimate of Pr, which, in turn, 
would imply a suboptimal flow of labor from industry X to industry Y.
There is another reason why the flow of labor may be suboptimal in case A. 
As has been pointed out in the discussion of equation (4.7©), for the latter to be 
an optimal decision rule, the market discount rate r must equal the social rate 
of discount p; this equality would be ensured in perfect capital markets. How 
ever, it is very likely that unemployed workers face imperfect capital markets 
and that their discount rates exceed the social rate of discount. In that instance,
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the flow of labor from sector X to sector Y would be lower than the socially op 
timal flow.
Case B: Employers in the Contracting Industry 
Bear the Adjustment Costs
We now assume that by law or by custom, employers in the contracting sec 
tor X are fully responsible for the payment of the adjustment costs of all em 
ployees who separate from the sector. An employer in this industry faces the 
situation in which, at time /0, the price of sector X falls, so that the value of the 
marginal product of labor (Px MPX) also falls. If the wage wx does not decrease 
by an equal amount, the employer lays off workers. However, as stipulated, the 
employer now has to pay the costs of moving workers to industry Y. Thus, the 
layoff decision is determined not only by the difference between the value of 
the marginal product and the wage, but also by the adjustment costs. Specifi 
cally, a profit-maximizing employer will lay off a worker when the resulting 
present and future labor cost savings exceed the marginal adjustment costs. 
Formally, this condition can be written as
fA i f\\ Ai / Vr \ ^ I /-.. r> »^r> \ _ v^ *'
where, as in case A, all variables are measured in units of Y. The equilibrium 
rate of layoffs is obtained when the "<" is replaced by an "=" in equation 
(4.10).
What is the wage level in sector X, namely, wx7 Since firms in the industry 
are responsible for the adjustment costs of all workers who move (whether be 
cause of layoffs or voluntary quits), wx tends to equality with the wage paid in 
sector Y. To see why this is so, consider that initially wx < wy. All employees 
in industry X then wish to be moved because they can earn a higher wage in 
industry Y and all costs of moving are paid by firms in industry X. This, how 
ever, would entail great total adjustment costs for employers in sector X, who 
are, therefore, induced to maintain their wages at the level of wy. In that situa 
tion, employees in sector X are indifferent between (1) staying, and (2) being 
laid off and moving to sector Y. Firms in industry X initiate layoffs and transfers 
of labor to industry Y. They do so at the rate N , which is implied by
(4.11)
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Thus, the system is in equilibrium when the rate of layoffs implies marginal ad 
justment costs equal to the present value of the difference between the value of 
the marginal product (= wage) in sector Y and the value of the marginal product 
of labor in sector X.
Comparison of equations (4.2), (4.7©), and (4.11) shows that, after appropri 
ate substitutions, they are all equivalent. All three imply the same socially op 
timal rate of flow of labor from sector X to sector Y.
When equation (4.11) holds, then Px MPX < wx = wy = MPy throughout the 
adjustment period. The marginal product of labor in sector Y determines both 
industries© wages. As labor flows from sector X to sector 7, the marginal prod 
uct of labor in sector Y and wages in both sectors gradually fall until the new 
level of wages is attained at t*. Figure 4.5 illustrates the movement of the wag- 






What are the implications of case B for the distribution of income? Since 
workers in both sectors X and Y receive identical real wages, there is no change 
in the relative distribution of wage incomes. Compared with case A, however, 
workers in industry X receive a higher real wage and workers in industry Y re 
ceive the same real wage.
Firms in industry X must now pay the total adjustment costs (TAG). In terms 
of net present value, these costs amount to
(4.12) TAG =
-r(T-/0)
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where, as before, ty(N ) is the price per transfer and N is the number of trans 
ferred employees. However, as compared with case A, there are other costs. 
Prior to tQ, PX MPX = MPy, so that nonlabor income is equal to PX(APX - MPX)NX 
= (Px APX - MPy)Nx. At r0, Px and» consequently, the value of the marginal 
product in industry X fall. Firms in sector X, however, must continue to pay the 
wage in sector Y, namely, wy = MPy > PX MPX . Hence, after t0 , (PX APX - MPy) 
< (PX APX - PX MPX) and this inequality is maintained until the new equilibrium 
is established at t*. Thus, compared with case A, nonlabor income in sector X 
is reduced: first, employers must pay adjustment costs TAC as defined by equa 
tion (4.12), and, second, employers must continue to pay the relatively high Y 
industry wage (wy) despite the decline in the value of labor©s marginal product 
in X (that is, P^PJ. As in case A, nonlabor incomes in sector Y tend to in 
crease when employers in sector X pay for the adjustment costs.
Case C: Employers in the Expanding Industry 
Bear the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, employers in the expanding sector Y bear the costs of trans 
ferring labor from sector X. As before, the marginal utility of Y rises in period 
r0 . Since by assumption, Py = 1, this means that PX MPX must be lower relative 
to Py MPy and consequently wx must fall. Firms in the expanding sector Y hire 
workers in sector X at a wage of w y, pay the moving costs of ())©( N ) per worker, 
and then employ these individuals in sector Y, where their contribution to pro 
duction is Py MPy. Employers will engage in this practice as long as the mar 
ginal adjustment cost is less than the present value of the difference between 
the value of the marginal product in sector Y and the wage w y. Thus, firms in 
industry Y transfer the profit-maximizing number of workers from industry X 
when the following condition is satisfied at any time after ?0 :
(4.13)
What is the wage w y for workers who have moved from sector X and are 
now working in sector Y? Since the marginal product of old and newly arrived 
workers in sector Y is equal to MPy, competition among the employers in sector 
Y ensures that wages must be such that w.y = w y = MPy no matter where the 
workers originated or who paid the adjustment costs. It is only under imperfect 
ly competitive conditions that w y may fall short of MPy. For instance, it may 
be possible that employers in industry Y can contractually bind workers from 
industry X to work at a wage less than MPy, in return for the payment of the
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moving costs by employers. Such indenture contracts are rarely enforceable in 
courts of law, however.
Since w y is highly likely to exceed Px MPX and may well be equal to MPy, 
we conclude that equation (4.13) is typically not the same as equations (4.2), 
(4.7©) or (4.11). Specifically, equation (4.13) tends to lead to an adjustment rate 
less than the socially optimal one. When employers in sector Y behave compet 
itively in the labor market, so that w y = MPy, the profit-maximizing flow of 
labor from industry X to industry Y is zero.
Case D: Government Bears the Adjustment Costs
In this situation, the government pays the adjustment costs for any worker 
laid off permanently in sector X, but it has no direct control over the number of 
layoffs. The adjustment costs are covered by general revenues that are financed 
by general taxes or by borrowing.
As before, at time t0 , MUy rises and thus Px and Px MPX fall. The wage in 
sector X, however, remains at wy. Layoffs are costless to sector X employers, 
and AW workers are laid off immediately; AN must be such as to maintain the 
equality wy = PX MPX. The government pays, more or less immediately, the ad 
justment costs for all layoffs and requires that workers relocate to sector Y. The 
new equilibrium (that is, point £2 in figure 4.1) is achieved virtually instanta 
neously. Given our basic assumption of rising marginal adjustment costs, this 
instantaneous adjustment would be nonoptimally fast and very costly. In other 
words, equation (4.2) would not be satisfied.
From Theory to Practice
We now assume that the relocation process consists of a period of unem 
ployment during which employees, who have left sector X, search for or wait 
for their new jobs in sector Y. Further, the duration (D) of this period of unem 
ployment lengthens with the total number of workers who leave the contracting 
sector. 3
Consider again case A, in which laid-off employees bear the costs of unem 
ployment as well as any additional financial costs of moving from sector X to 
sector Y. Further, wages in both sectors are fully flexible and adjust to their re 
spective marginal products, that is, wy = MPy and wx = PX MPX at all times. Em 
ployees in sector X have the choice of remaining in that industry and receiving 
the wage, as in equation (4.4), of wxt = Pxt MPxt, or of leaving sector X, waiting 
for a period D (measured in years), and then receiving
(4.14) NPVy(t + D) -g©(N) = J
t + D
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where g©(N) represents any costs of moving to sector Y additional to the cost 
of waiting, and NPVy(t+D^ is the net present value at time t of the wages earned 
in sector Y from period (t + D) onward.
If initially [NPVy(t+D) - g©(N )] > NPVxt, individual workers move from sec 
tor X to sector Y. However, as more and more do so, the unemployment dura 
tion D and the additional adjustment cost g©(N) rise, and the earnings stream 
in sector Y is postponed. Hence, NPVy(t+D^ falls and g©(N) rises until the equi 
librium rate of transfer is reached when [NPVy^t+D^ - g©(N)] = NPVxl, that is, 
when individual workers are indifferent between (1) staying in sector X, and (2) 
leaving sector X, waiting for a period of D, paying the additional financial ad 
justment cost g©(N), and from then on earning wyT (= MPy^).
Thus, NPVy(t+D) - g©(N ) = NPVxt is the condition for the equilibrium rate 








to both sides of equation (4.15) and rearrange to obtain:
(4.16)
Comparison of equations (4.7©) and (4.17), which follows, leads to the impor 
tant conclusion that, in the model postulated in case A, the marginal adjustment 
costs are the sum of the net present value of the wages foregone in sector Y be 
cause of the waiting period and any additional financial adjustment costs
t + D
(4.17) ti(N) = f w <Tr(T ~ J y *
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Furthermore, the equilibrium rate of transfer of labor implied by equation 
(4.16) is the same as that expressed in equation (4.2) which is the socially op 
timal rate.
Now let us introduce a system, as in case B, where benefits are usually 
charged partially to workers© previous employers in sector X. The firm©s layoff 
decision can be presented formally as follows. The present value at time t 
(PVBD) of the weekly unemployment benefits received by a laid-off worker is
t + D
(4.18) PVBD = J
where b is the weekly benefit amount (expressed at an annual rate) and D is 
the duration of unemployment (measured in years, so that, for example, 0.25 
stands for 13 weeks). The proportion of UI benefits paid for by firms is 0 (typ 
ically 0 < 9 < 1). Thus, QPVBD represents the marginal tax cost of layoffs to 
the representative firm in the contracting sector. It depends positively on the 
waiting period D and the weekly benefit payments b and negatively on the rate 
of interest r.
The condition for the firm©s profit-maximizing layoffs is given by the equal 
ity of marginal costs and marginal benefits:
(4.19) QPVBD = J
Is the firm©s profit-maximizing layoff rate, as determined by equation 
(4.19), equal to the socially optimal rate of layoffs, as given by equation (4.16)? 
To answer this question, the wage in sector X, wx in equation (4.19), needs to 
be determined. This is done in the framework of two alternative assumptions 
about the working of the labor market. It is assumed, first, that markets are per 
fect, such that wages in sector X are flexible; the second alternative is that rel 
ative wages in sector X are inflexible and are equal to wages in sector Y, that is,
When the wage rates w^ in equation (4.19) are flexible, their present value 
must be determined by the equality of the properly discounted income streams 
in sectors X and Y:
(4.20) j Wjrtrrt~rft = pvfl0 + J
t t + D
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The right-hand side of equation (4.20) consists of the earnings in sector Y 
from period (t + D) onward, plus the unemployment benefits for the period t to 
(t + D), less the financial costs of transferring to sector Y. It is, thus, the present 
value of the net income earned in sector 7, which, in the flexible wage model, 
must equal the present value of the returns from staying in sector X, namely the 
left-hand side of equation (4.20). Equation (4.20) is now used to replace the 
present value of the earnings stream in equation (4.19), which then becomes
t + D 
(4.21)
In view of the definition of PVBD given in equation (4.18), the above condition 




Since 0 < 9 < 1 and b < MPy = wy (unemployment benefits average around 50 
to 60 percent of wages) we conclude that, with given D and N, the left-hand 
side of equation (4.22) must be less than that of equation (4.16). To maintain 
the postulated equality to the right-hand side in these two equations, N and D 
must be higher under the conditions of equation (4.22) than under those of 
equation (4.16). Thus, imperfect experience rating, which occurs because 9 < 
1, leads to nonoptimally high layoffs by firms and to levels of unemployment 
that are higher than optimal (caused by the lengthening of D).
Under the second set of conditions, the relative wages in sector X are inflex 
ible and are equal to the wages in sector 7, that is, wx = wy = MPy. In this case 
equation (4.19) becomes
(4.23) QPVBD = J (3fPyt -AfPJcTPJtt)rr(T © rfc.
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Comparison of equations (4. 16) and (4.23) suggests that the optimal transfer 
of labor from sector X to sector Y requires, under the current assumptions, that 
the marginal tax costs of layoffs, QPVBD, be equal to the present value of wy 
from period t to period (t + D} plus any additional costs of transfer, or
t + D t + D 
(4.24) 6 J be~r(̂ ~ t} di = J MP e~r(*~^dt + g© (N) .
Since, in practice 0 < 6 < 1 and b < MPy, this equality does not hold. In other 
words, the profit-maximizing layoff decision implied by equation (4.23) leads 
to layoffs and an unemployment duration that are in excess of the socially op 
timal ones. Socially optimal layoffs and unemployment duration may be 
achieved by raising 0 and/or b . For that purpose, the increase in unemploy 
ment benefits b need not actually be paid to the unemployed workers. It serves 
to raise the marginal costs of layoffs in equation (4.23), so that the rate of lay 
offs and consequently the duration and level of unemployment are reduced to 
ward their social optima.
NOTES
1. In other chapters of this book the symbol T has been used to denote the tax rate. Since the 
contexts are quite different, this should not cause any confusion.
2. Nonlabor income accrues to all other factors of production and to entrepreneurs as pure 
profits.
3. In this respect, the present specification differs from that of the standard search theory of 
unemployment, according to which unemployed workers search until they have located their res 
ervation wage. At this point, individuals terminate the period of unemployment. In the present 
specification, unemployed workers take the waiting period as given, although it lengthens as the 
total number of transfers from sector X to sector Y increases.

Financing the Costs 
of Permanent Job Losses
Under the Reserve 
and Benefit Ratio Methods
We now turn to an investigation of how the two predominant meth 
ods of experience rating internalize the charged benefits of, and 
thereby affect, permanent layoffs. Permanent, unlike temporary, lay 
offs do entail long-run employment reductions and permanent 
decreases in the taxable payroll. These decreases make the ensuing 
analysis of the reserve and benefit ratio methods particularly complex.
First, we shall investigate the marginal tax costs of permanent lay 
offs when the employer is and expects to remain at either the maximum 
or the minimum tax rate. This analysis applies to both methods of 
experience rating. Second, we examine the tax costs of permanent lay 
offs under the reserve ratio method when employers are and expect to 
remain on the sloped part of the tax schedule. Third, we analyze these 
costs for employers who are and expect to remain on the sloped part of 
the benefit ratio tax schedule. We then compare the tax costs under the 
two methods of experience rating.
Minimum and Maximum Tax Rates
Consider an employer whose long-run position is at the maximum 
tax rate under either the reserve or benefit ratio method of experience 
rating. The employer©s tax payments are less than his/her charged ben 
efits arising from temporary layoffs. Since the tax rate is fixed, there is 
no automatic way in which tax payments can be raised and brought 
into equality with charged benefits. Permanent layoffs will cause addi 
tional charged benefits, but, since these layoffs also reduce the taxable 
payroll, tax payments must fall. Hence, with increased benefits and
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reduced tax payments, the firm©s deficit in its unemployment insurance 
(UI) account grows.
There is no possibility that the employer can be moved to the sloped 
(that is, experience-rated) part of the tax schedule. After the temporary 
increase in charged benefits due to the permanent layoffs, charged ben 
efits will decline; this occurs because, with a constant temporary layoff 
rate, the reduction in employment brings about a fall in temporary lay 
offs. Nevertheless, the employer will remain at the maximum tax rate.
The same reasoning applies to those employers whose long-run 
position is at the minimum tax rate, at which tax payments exceed 
charged benefits. The increase in charged benefits due to the downward 
adjustment of employment may drive the employer temporarily to the 
sloped part of the tax schedule, but, in the long run, the employer must 
remain at the minimum tax rate. Permanent employment reductions 
lead to decreases in taxable payrolls and, at the constant minimum or 
maximum tax rates, to reduced tax payments. This means that the mar 
ginal tax cost of permanent layoffs is negative. Employers receive a tax 
reward for permanently laying off employees.
Let us elaborate upon the preceding analysis using the notation of 
chapter 2. The employer©s long-run position at the maximum tax rate 
(TMAX) is characterized by the following inequality: TMAX H> N* < buN*, 
where N* is the initial level of employment, w is the taxable wage base 
(so that w N* is the taxable payroll), b measures the benefits paid per 
unemployment spell, and u is the temporary layoff rate (so that buN* 
represents the charged benefits). All variables refer to the employer©s 
long-run position.
Suppose now that AW employees are laid off permanently and that 
the new long-run level of employment is Af** (or N* - AAT). During the 
downward adjustment from N* to Af**, charged benefits rise by bAN 
because of the permanent layoffs. Once the new long-run position is 
reached, however, the level of charged benefits will again be deter 
mined by temporary layoffs.
In the new long-run situation, both the tax bill and charged benefits 
will have fallen by the same proportion, so that benefit payments will 
continue to exceed taxes, or TMAX wN** < buN**. In other words, 
changes in the level of long-run employment cannot turn an excess of 
benefits over taxes into a shortfall. Hence, these changes cannot move 
the employer to the sloped part of the tax schedule. Such a move can
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only be achieved by increases in TMAX and w or by decreases in b and 
u.
A numerical example may be helpful. Suppose that, in the initial 
long run, the taxable wage base w is $7,000, the maximum tax rate 
TMAX is 6 percent, the average unemployment benefit b per (temporary) 
layoff spell is $3,000, the temporary layoff rate u is 15 percent, and the 
beginning level of employment N* is 100. This means that, in the ini 
tial long run, the employer©s tax payments are T*= ($7,000) (0.06) 
(100) = $42,000, and the charged benefits are Cfl*= ($3,000) (0.15) 
(100) = $45,000. Thus, the charged benefits exceed the tax payments.
Suppose now that the employer permanently lays off 10 employees. 
This leads to a short-run increase in benefits of (10) ($3,000) = 
$30,000. In the new long run, however, both taxes and benefits are 
lower by 10 percent, namely 7**= ($7,000) (0.06) (90) = $37,800, and 
Cfl**= ($3,000) (0.15) (90) = $40,500. Changes in employment cannot 
convert a deficit into a surplus, but they do affect the size of the deficit.
A very similar argument is relevant to an employer whose long-run 
position is at TMIN , where tax payments exceed the benefit flows, or 
TMIN H>Af* > buN*. As before, a permanent reduction in the long-run 
level of employment from W* to W** causes a temporary increase of 
bAN in charged benefits. However, in the new long run, both taxes and 
benefit payments must fall in the same proportion, and the employer©s 
excess of taxes over benefits cannot be changed into a shortfall. 
Because of the short-run increase in benefits, the employer may move 
temporarily from TMIN to TSLOPE, but, in the new long run, the employer 
must return to TMIN. Only decreases in TMIN and w or increases in b and 
u can shift the employer permanently to the sloped part of the tax 
schedule.
Consider now the marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs for 
employers who are and remain at TMAX or TMIN . Their tax bills are 
TMAX wAf* or TMIN wA^*, and so their marginal tax costs are TMAX vv AW 
or TMIN H> AN, respectively. Since AN is the employment reduction, the 
marginal tax cost is negative. Thus, the employers receive a marginal 
reward for laying off workers permanently. When the taxable wage 
base w is $7,000, the maximum tax rate TMAX is 6 percent, and the 
minimum tax rate TMIN is 0.5 percent, then the annual tax reward for 
laying off an employee is $420 and $35 for employers who are at TMAX 
and TMIN, respectively. The net present values of these annual amounts
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is likely to be quite substantial. Ironically, employers at TMIN, who are 
net contributors to the UI fund, receive a smaller tax reward from per 
manent layoffs than do employers at TMAx, who are net claimants.
The marginal tax costs of temporary layoffs have been found to be 
zero for employers who are located permanently at TMAX or TMIN .© For 
permanent layoffs, our analysis in this section shows that the marginal 
tax costs are negative and that they vary inversely with the taxable 
wage base w and the tax rate, TMAX or TMIN . Thus, the marginal tax 
costs will differ from state to state.
The Reserve Ratio Method of Experience Rating
We now turn our attention to those employers whose long-run posi 
tion is on the sloped part of the tax schedule and examine, first of all, 
the reserve ratio method of experience rating. We postulate that the 
employer©s UI account is initially in a steady state, which means that 
the balance does not change through time. (This balance has already 
been defined in chapter 2, equation (2.3).) Its stability implies a reserve 
ratio and tax rate such that an employer©s tax payments have been 
brought into equality with charged benefits. For a steady state to 
emerge, the level of employment, the temporary layoff rate, and the 
parameters of the UI system have to remain constant for at least five 
calendar years. This is implied by the lags in the reserve ratio method 
described in chapter 2.
In the steady state, the employers© balances depend on their level of 
employment. If the initial steady state balance is positive, then it rises 
and falls equiproportionately with the level of employment. Thus, a 
permanent reduction in employment of x percent leads to a decrease in 
the steady state balance of x percent. The decline in the balance, in 
turn, implies that total charged benefits must exceed total tax payments 
during the period of adjustment: under the reserve ratio method of 
experience rating, any excess of charged benefits over tax payments is 
financed by a reduction in the employer©s balance.
Consequently, the difference between the steady state balances 
before and after the employment reduction measures the cumulative 
excess of charged benefits over tax payments. Employers need not pay
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for all the charged benefits caused by the permanent layoffs because 
the reserve ratio method allows them to draw down their balances in 
the UI account. This situation is the basic reason why there cannot be 
complete experience rating of the charged benefits attributable to per 
manent layoffs. Since we know the charged benefits caused by perma 
nent layoffs and the gap between cumulative charged benefits and tax 
payments, we are able to compute a marginal tax cost of permanent 
layoffs. These costs are less than the marginal tax costs of temporary 
layoffs.
The preceding arguments can be presented in the formal terms of 
equations (2.3) to (2.5) in chapter 2. The employer©s steady state bal 
ance (B*) occurs when tax payments (T) equal charged benefits (CB). 
Thus, according to equation (2.3), when Tt = CBt for at least three cal 
endar years, then Bt - Bt_i = Bt_2 = B*. This requires that the level of 
employment (AO, the rate of temporary layoffs (w), the benefits per 
unemployment spell (b), the taxable wage base (w), the intercept (a) 
of the tax schedule, and the slope (s) of the tax schedule have all been 
constant for at least five calendar years. In that case, the tax bill for 
year t can be written as
(5.1) T* = tvWV* = awN*-sB*,
where JV* is the initial steady state level of employment. As before, the 
level of charged benefits is
(5.2) CB* = buN* . 
The equality of tax payments and charged benefits implies that
(5.3) awN*-sB* = buN* ,
which can be solved for the steady state level of the employer©s bal 
ance:
(5.4) B* = -(aw-bu)N*. 
s
This equation shows that the initial steady state balance is affected pos 
itively by increases in a and w and negatively by increases in s, b, and
86 Financing the Costs of Permanent Job Losses
u. In our subsequent discussion, the influence of changes in the steady 
state level of employment W* will be especially important. The impact 
of such changes on B* is positive if aw > bu and negative if aw < bu. 
The inequality aw < bu implies, however, that the employer has a neg 
ative steady state balance. According to the laws of most states, 
employers with negative balances, and therefore negative reserve 
ratios, are usually assigned the maximum tax rate (TMAX). Thus, 
employers on the sloped part of the tax schedule can be presumed to 
have positive balances. We consequently assume for the remainder of 
this chapter that aw > bu, so that changes in N* affect B* positively.
Although the employer©s steady state balance is influenced by the 
level of employment, note that both the steady state reserve ratio and 
the steady state tax rate are independent of the level of employment. 
The steady state reserve ratio is RR* = B*/wN*, which, in turn, equals 
(a - bu/w)/s. The steady state tax rate is T* = ub/w. It follows that 
employment changes cannot drive the steady state solution to TMAX or 
%IN if me employer©s steady state reserve ratio and tax rate are on the 
sloped part of the tax schedule.
It has been shown that the dynamic system represented by equations 
(2.3), (2.4), and (2.5) is stable if RR <RR*< RR and if 0 < s < 1 . 2 When 
these conditions are satisfied, and if N and all the parameters of the 
system have been constant through time, then RR, T, and B will con 
verge to RR*, T*, and B*, no matter whether the firm starts from TMAX, 
TSLOPE»  r TMIN- The movement toward the steady state is achieved by 
the adjustment of the tax rate and, thus, the tax bill to bring the latter 
into equality with charged benefits. If initially T > CB, then T and T 
fall. On the other hand, if initially, T < CB, then i and T rise.
We now postulate that there is a hypothetical employer whose UI 
finance account is in a steady state on the sloped part of the tax sched 
ule. This initial steady state, with its employment level of N*, is dis 
turbed by permanent layoffs of AW, which reduce the level of 
employment to TV** (where TV** = W* - AW, so that AW is a positive 
number). During the downsizing, the employer©s charged benefits rise 
by bAN, but they decline thereafter because, with a constant temporary 
layoff rate, the level of these layoffs must fall with the level of employ 
ment. After m years, the employer©s account is in a new steady state; 
here tax payments again equal charged benefits, and the reserve ratio 
and the tax rate are the same as in the initial steady state (that is, R** =
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/?*, and f** = T*). Consequently, the new steady state must again be on 
the sloped part of the tax schedule. However, the employer©s steady 
state balance has fallen to 5**, where #** < B*.
During the period of adjustment from J5* to 5**, total charged bene 
fits must exceed total tax payments. The deficit is financed by and must 




which, according to equation (5.4), must be equal to
(5.6) B*-B**= -(aw-bu)AN. 
s
According to equations (5.4) and (5.6), the larger the intercept a of 
the tax schedule and the taxable wage base w, the larger the cumula 
tive shortfall of tax inflows will be. Also, the smaller the slope s of the 
tax schedule and the per-employee charged benefits due to temporary 
layoffs bu, the larger will be the cumulative shortfall of tax inflows.
Since the charged benefits due to permanent layoffs are bAN and the 
tax shortfall is given by equation (5.6), we can compute the marginal 
tax costs as the difference between the charged benefits and the tax 
shortfall. In other words, if the charged benefits are not financed by a 
reduction in the balance, then they must be paid via increased taxes. 
Consequently, the marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are as fol 
lows:
(5.7) Marginal Tax Costs of Permanent Layoffs
= \b--(aw-bu) \AN .
is J
If the employer©s balance is positive, so that aw > bu, the marginal tax 
cost is always less than the charged benefits caused by permanent lay 
offs. Equation (5.7) implies that the marginal tax cost tends to rise with 
the benefit rate b, the temporary layoff rate u, and the slope s of the tax 
schedule and to fall with increases in the intercept a of the tax schedule 
and the taxable wage base w.
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An arithmetic example may be helpful. Suppose that the intercept a 
of the tax schedule is 0.07, the slope s is 0.25, the taxable wage base w 
is $7,000, the temporary layoff rate u is 0.10, and the benefits per 
unemployment spell b amount to $2,500. Then, according to equation 
(5.6), for every laid-off employee, tax inflows must fall short of benefit 
outflows during the adjustment period by an amount equal to [(0.07) 
(7,000) - (0.10) 2,500)]/0.25 = 960. Thus, if the firm is charged the full 
$2,500 for a laid-off worker, its taxes will increase by only $1,540; the 
proportionate marginal tax cost is 61.6 percent. The remaining $960 is 
financed by a reduction in the firm©s balance.
The discussion so far has been couched in terms of the sum of the 
undiscounted tax shortfalls over the period of adjustment. This corre 
sponds to the present reserve ratio method of experience rating and is 
equivalent to assuming a zero interest rate. Since benefits to perma 
nently laid-off employees are paid in period (t + 1) but increases in tax 
payments begin only in period (t + 3), a positive rate of interest induces 
rational employers to discount future tax liabilities back to period 
(t + 1). This discounting reduces the present value of future tax liabili 
ties and increases any tax shortfall. As the tax shortfall increases, the 
marginal tax costs of layoffs must fall. Discounting by employers will 
reduce the value of the marginal tax cost given by equation (5.7) and in 
the numerical example of the previous paragraph.
It should be pointed out that the undiscounted tax shortfall, equal to 
the decline in the steady state balance, is the same whether or not the 
tax rate is constrained by TMAX during the period of adjustment. Since 
/?/?** = RR* lies on the sloped part of the tax schedule, the firm must 
eventually return to the initial TSLOPE. When the unconstrained reserve 
ratio method generates a tax rate in excess of TMAX , the constraint 
reduces tax payments and thus decreases the growth of the reserve 
ratio. Since the reserve ratio method has an infinitely long memory, a 
binding TMAX increases the period over which the adjustment takes 
place, but it does not affect the total undiscounted tax shortfall. The 
lower the TMAX, however, the later will tax payments be made; thus, the 
sum of the discounted tax shortfall decreases with a decline in TMAX .
Cook (1992) found that the marginal tax cost of temporary layoffs is 
equal to bAN for employers at TSLOPE facing a zero rate of interest. 
Hence, employers whose steady state position is on the sloped part of 
the tax schedule are completely experience rated when the rate of inter-
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est is zero. Similar results have been obtained by other researchers. Our 
results show that the same conclusion does not hold for permanent lay 
offs. If employers have positive balances in their UI account, then the 
marginal tax cost of permanent layoffs is less than bAN, even if the rate 
of interest is zero. This result seems not to have been treated before in 
the literature. 3
In the preceding analysis, it has been assumed that the employer 
puts no value on the reduction of his/her account balance due to perma 
nent layoffs. Costs arise only from taxes. This assumption appears to 
be realistic in the present institutional framework, in which the 
employer©s balance is simply a convenient accounting device. If the 
employer could be made to value fully the reduction in the balance, 
then the tax shortfall would disappear and the marginal (tax plus bal 
ance) costs of permanent layoffs would be equal to charged benefits. In 
chapter 6, these ideas are developed further and lead to the policy pro 
posals that interest be paid on balances and that employers be given 
limited opportunities to dispose of their balances.
There is one other interesting result of the foregoing discussion of 
the reserve ratio method of experience rating. Equation (5.6) implies 
that the tax shortfall when employment declines, measured by the 
change in the balance, would be precisely equal to the tax surplus when 
employment rises by an equal amount. In other words, under the 
reserve ratio method, tax payments exactly equal charged benefits over 
a complete employment cycle. Similarly, when some employers are 
contracting and others are expanding, the former have a tax shortfall 
and the latter a tax surplus, so that the aggregate balance need not be 
affected much. As will be pointed out in the following section, the 
same situation does not hold for the benefit ratio method.
The Benefit Ratio Method of Experience Rating
Our next step is to evaluate how the benefit ratio method works with 
permanent reductions in the level of employment. For this purpose, we 
postulate that the UI account of the hypothetical employer is in an ini 
tial "steady state," in which the relevant variables have been constant 
for at least five calendar years, so that neither the firm©s charged bene-
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fits nor its tax payments vary through time. 4 It is not necessary here, 
however, for tax payments to equal charged benefits.
The initial steady state is disturbed by permanent layoffs. After five 
calendar years, a new steady state is established, with a lower level of 
employment. All the other relevant variables have remained the same. 
The question that we wish to answer is the following: Over the five- 
year period, by how much have taxes increased in response to the 
charged benefits attributable to the permanent layoffs?
Two opposing factors affect the charged benefits over the period of 
adjustment. First, permanent layoffs raise charged benefits; second, 
with a constant temporary layoff rate, the lower permanent level of 
employment reduces the level of charged benefits. Hence, when cumu 
lated over five years, charged benefits may either rise or fall. The 
higher the temporary layoff rate, the more likely the fall in cumulative 
charged benefits.
Tax payments are also subject to two opposing forces. The decline 
in the level of employment leads to an immediate reduction in the tax 
able payroll and consequently to a fall in tax liabilities. On the other 
hand, any increase in charged benefits may lead to a rise in the tax rate. 
The net outcome cannot be determined theoretically, but, with plausi 
ble assumptions about the relevant parameter values, the cumulative 
tax payments will fall.
As before, the net tax shortfall is defined as the difference between 
the cumulative charged benefits and the cumulative tax payments. We 
have found that, in general, the tax shortfall may be positive or negative 
under the benefit ratio method of experience rating and is crucially 
dependent upon the slope of the tax function. When this slope is close 
to unity, as it is in most states, the tax shortfall is definitely positive: 
cumulative tax payments are insufficient to pay for the increased 
charged benefits caused by permanent layoffs.
The marginal tax cost of a permanent layoff is less than that of a 
temporary layoff under the benefit ratio method of experience rating, 
as is true under the reserve ratio method. There are significant differ 
ences between the tax costs of temporary and of permanent layoffs.
We will now derive these results in the framework of the model of 
the benefit ratio method presented in chapter 2. Assume that the 
employer©s UI account is in a steady state, which requires that the vari 
ables w , TV*, u, b, c, and k have been constant for at least five years. As
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in chapter 2, c is the intercept, and k is the slope of the tax schedule. 
The charged benefits amount to CB* = ubN*, the benefit ratio is BR* = 
ub/w , and, assuming that the firm is on the sloped part of the tax 
schedule (that is, as in figure 2.2, BR < BR* < M), the tax rate is 
TSLQPE* = c + kBR*. Consequently, the employer©s tax bill in the initial 
steady state is equal to
(5.8) T* = cwN* + kubN* .
When c = 0 and k = 1, then T* = CB*= ubN*; that is, tax payments 
equal charged benefits.
The initial steady state is now disturbed. At the end of year t, the 
firm permanently lays off AN workers, who receive unemployment 
benefits in year (t + 1). The new permanent level of employment is N** 
= N* - AN. At the beginning of year (t + 6) the firm reaches a new 
steady state. The new charged benefits are CB** = ub(N* - AN) = CB* 
- ubAN. The steady state benefit ratio, by contrast, is independent of the 
level of employment and remains at BR** = BR* = ub/w. The equality 
of the two steady state benefit ratios implies that the two steady state 
tax rates are also equal to one another (that is, TSLOPE**= TSLOPE*). 
Thus, the new steady state tax bill is equal to
(5.9) T**= cw (N* - AN) + hub (N* - AN) .
This means that the permanent drop in the level of employment lowers 
the tax liability by T* - T** = AN(cw + kub), which reduces to T* - 
T** = ubAN when c - 0 and k = 1. The reason for the decline in the tax 
liability is that, with a constant temporary layoff rate, the reduction in 
employment causes a fall in temporary layoffs.
In years (t + I) to (t + 5), the firm©s tax liability adjusts from the first 
to the second steady state level. In year (t + 1), charged benefits rise by 
bAN because of permanent layoffs and fall by ANub because of 
reduced temporary layoffs, so that the net increase is bAN(l - u). In 
years (t + 2), (t + 3), (t + 4), and (t + 5), charged benefits are below 
their initial steady state level by an amount equal to ubAN. This means 
that the sum of the (undiscounted) additional charged benefits over the 
entire five years equals
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(5.10)
i= 1
As previously stated, when summed over the five years of transition, 
charged benefits may rise or fall. The larger the temporary layoff rate, 
the more probable the fall in charged benefits.
What happens to taxes during the adjustment period? Assume ini 
tially that the firm remains on the sloped part of the tax schedule 
throughout the adjustment period, i.e., that ir < TMAX at all times. As 
specified in chapter 2, the tax rate reacts to changes in the benefit ratio 
with a two-year lag. This means that the tax rates for the years (t + 1) 
and (t + 2) are the same as in the initial steady state (lt+ i = it+2 = 
TSLOPE*). Because of the decline in the taxable payroll, however, the tax 
payments in these years must fall. These changes can be easily ascer 
tained as
(5.11) Tt + l -T* = -(cw + kub)&N and
(5.12)
The derivation of the changes in the tax bill for the years (t + 3), (t + 
4), and (t + 5) is straightforward but tedious. If the firm does not reach 
TMAX during the adjustment period, the changes are as follows:
r ( N** \~\
(5.13) T,.--T* = -\cw + bk( u- ————— AW, 
r + 3 |_ V 2W*+W**©J
C5 14s) T -T* = -\p.i*; i t + 4 i | , ^N** ^
C5 15^ T _ T* =\~> - i -©/ t + 5
The sum of the (undiscounted) changes in the tax bill is equal to
5
(5.16) ^(Tt + i -T*) = -[5cw-bk(&-5u)
i= 1
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where
A/** 
(5.17) 5 = . 
AT**© + 2N* 2#**" + N* 3
Since N** <N*,it can readily be shown that 8 in equation (5.17) must 
be less than unity (i.e., that 5 < 1). Further, it is easy to show that 8 falls 
as the relative difference between N* and N** increases.
In order to ascertain any possible tax shortfall, we simply deduct 
equation (5.16) from equation (5.10):
(5.18) [(CBt + i -CB*) - (Tt+ .-T*)
AA/"
This expression may be negative, which would imply that the firm©s tax 
payments exceed its charged benefits during the years of adjustment. In 
practice, the slope of the tax function k is usually equal to unity. In that 
case, equation (5.18) becomes
(5.19) [(CB-cB*) - (r.-r*) ]t+i
i= 1
Now the tax shortfall is always positive.
The charged benefits arising from the permanent layoffs are equal to 
bAN, and the tax shortfall is given by equation (5.18). The (undis- 
counted) marginal tax cost is defined as the difference between the 
former and the latter, namely:
(5.20) Marginal Tax Cost of Permanent Layoffs
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Equation (5.20) implies that the larger the relative employment decline 
(that is, the smaller the 8) and the benefit rate b, the larger the marginal 
tax cost. Also, the smaller the intercept of the tax schedule c and the 
taxable wage base w, the larger the marginal tax cost. The slope k of 
the tax schedule and the temporary layoff rate u have an uncertain 
impact on the marginal tax cost. When A; is 1, as it is in most benefit 
ratio states, equation (5.20) reduces to (&S - 5cw )AAf.
A numerical example may again be helpful. Suppose that, as before, 
the benefit per layoff spell is $2,500 and the interest rate is zero. If the 
reduction in employment is 20 percent, the intercept of the tax sched 
ule is 0.5 percent and the taxable wage base is $7,000, then, according 
to equation (5.17), 5 is 93 percent and the marginal tax cost of one lay 
off is $(68 - 5cw) = [($2,500) (.93) - (5) (.005) ($7,000)] which is 
equal to $2,150 or 86 percent of the charged benefits.
Cook (1992) found that under the benefit ratio method, the marginal 
tax cost of temporary layoffs with a zero rate of interest and a unitary 
slope of the tax function is equal to bAN, which implies complete expe 
rience rating. Equation (5.20) shows that the (undiscounted) marginal 
tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of temporary layoffs 
for two reasons: first, 8 < 1, and, second, c > 0.
Equations (5.11) to (5.20) are based on the assumption that the firm 
does not reach TMAX during the period of adjustment from the initial to 
the new steady state. If this assumption is incorrect and the permanent 
layoffs do push the employer to TMAX temporarily, then the marginal tax 
costs of permanent layoffs are reduced. This result is due to the rela 
tively short memory of the benefit ratio method: past charged benefits 
are soon forgotten, and the employer©s tax payments are not required to 
account for them.
As in the case of the reserve ratio method discussed in the previous 
section, the marginal tax costs have been computed under the assump 
tion that the rate of interest is zero. This is because neither system of 
experience rating currently incorporates a positive rate of interest. As 
shown in the previous section, discounted marginal tax costs fall short 
of undiscounted ones. They do not change the basic conclusion that the 
marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of tempo 
rary layoffs.
Equation (5.19) is an expression for the tax shortfall when there is a 
reduction in the level of employment. What happens when employ-
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ment rises? It turns out that the tax surplus caused by an employment 
increase of AAf is equal to 5cw AN. Thus, the tax surplus in an employ 
ment upswing is less than the tax shortfall in the downswing, so that, 
over a complete employment cycle, taxes must fall short of charged 
benefits. 5 Further, in an economy where there is no no aggregate job 
growth, the deficit balances of contracting employers will not be totally 
offset by the surplus balances of expanding employers. Thus, the bene 
fit ratio method of experience rating lacks the completely automatic 
financing mechanism implied by the reserve ratio method.
The Essential Differences Between the Two Methods
As pointed out in the second section of this chapter, the two experi 
ence rating methods are basically identical when the long-run position 
of the employer is on the flat parts of the tax schedule. Therefore, the 
present discussion is confined to those cases where the steady state 
reserve and benefit ratios lie on the slope of the tax schedule. The fol 
lowing differences between the reserve ratio and benefit ratio methods 
of experience rating appear to be particularly relevant to permanent 
layoffs.
1. Both methods of experience rating tend to generate tax shortfalls 
when the level of employment is reduced. This implies that the mar 
ginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than their charged benefits. 
Under the reserve ratio method, the tax shortfall is associated with and 
financed by a reduction in the employer©s balance in the UI trust fund. 
Under the benefit ratio method, on the other hand, the tax shortfall is 
caused by the lags in the system. After a decline in employment, the 
current taxable payroll is less than the (recent) past taxable payroll, so 
that the relevant benefit ratio is too low to generate the taxes for the 
increased charged benefits.
The responses of the marginal tax costs to changes in the various 
exogenous parameters have already been described in the last two sec 
tions. For the sake of comparison, they are restated in table 5.1. The 
sign predictions are the same for the taxable wage base, benefits per 
unemployment spell, and the intercept of the tax function under both 
methods of experience rating. When tax costs are discounted, the sign
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predictions in table 5.1 do not change with the exception that the 
impact of TMAX is positive under the reserve ratio method.
Table 5.1 Impact of Parameter Changes on the Undiscounted Marginal 
Tax Cost
Experience rating method
Parameter increases Reserve ratio Benefit ratio
Taxable wage base - -
Benefits per unemployment spell + +
Temporary layoff rate + 0
Maximum tax rate 0 +
Relative change in employment level 0
Slope of tax function + a
Intercept of tax function - - 
a. Direction of impact is indeterminate.
2. When there is a relatively "long-run" employment cycle that is, 
a decline in employment of A/V followed after several years by an 
increase of AN—then the tax shortfall in the downswing is equal to the 
tax surplus in the upswing under the reserve ratio method. Over the full 
cycle, benefit outflows equal (undiscounted) tax inflows. By contrast, 
under the benefit ratio method, there is a shortfall in the downswing but 
no tax surplus in the upswing. Consequently, the benefit ratio method 
implies a tax shortfall over the entire employment cycle.
3. During the period of adjustment from a high to a low long-run 
level of employment, the employer may temporarily reach the maxi 
mum tax rate TMAX under either method of experience rating. Under the 
reserve ratio method, this temporary maximum tax rate does not affect 
the total (undiscounted) tax shortfall. The employer will have to make 
up the lost taxes at a later time. By contrast, under the benefit ratio 
method, because of its short memory, the tax shortfall is never offset. 
Hence, the lower the binding TMAX , the larger the tax shortfall.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we have examined the extent to which the two meth 
ods of experience rating internalize the costs of permanent layoffs. We 
have concluded that neither method internalizes these costs com 
pletely, even when the employer©s account is placed on the slope of the 
tax schedule. This result is different from those obtained for temporary 
layoffs by other researchers. When the firm is always on the slope of 
the tax schedule, both methods of experience rating typically internal 
ize all the (undiscounted) charged benefits of temporary layoffs but 
only part of the charged benefits of permanent layoffs.
The two experience-rating methods react differently to these condi 
tions because the tax base, namely, the taxable payroll, remains con 
stant with temporary layoffs, but declines with permanent layoffs. The 
decline in the taxable payroll reduces the tax bill and thus counteracts 
the rise in the tax rate due to the increase in charged benefits. Thus, 
payroll taxes are not the ideal means of internalizing the charged bene 
fits of permanent layoffs.
When the firm is and remains at the maximum or the minimum tax 
rate, it receives a tax reward for laying off workers permanently and 
has a zero tax cost of temporary layoffs. Hence, our research supports 
the frequently made recommendation of increased maximum tax rates 
and decreased minimum tax rates: the tax costs of temporary layoffs 
would rise and the tax rewards for permanent layoffs would fall for 
those employers who are moved from the flat to the sloped section of 
the tax schedule.
We next consider which method of experience rating is superior in 
internalizing the charged benefits of permanent layoffs. Simple arith 
metic examples have shown that realistic parameters values lead to 
(undiscounted) marginal tax costs that are somewhat higher for the 
benefit ratio than for the reserve ratio method. Nevertheless, we regard 
the reserve ratio method as superior for two reasons. First, when the 
steady state tax rate is on the slope of the tax schedule, the change in 
the employer©s UI account balance measures the tax shortfall under the 
reserve ratio method. Thus, if employers can be made to value fully 
their balances, then complete internalization of charged benefits would 
occur. Second, as indicated before, both methods of experience rating
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suffer from the shortcoming that future tax payments are not dis 
counted. This can be remedied easily in the case of the reserve ratio 
method, simply by paying interest on positive balances and charging 
interest on negative balances. Under the benefit ratio method, by con 
trast, there is no balance, so that neither of these two changes could be 
effected.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Card and Levine (1994) or our own discussion in chapter 2.
2. See Brechling( 1977).
3. There is an inconsistency in the empirical work of Card and Levine (1992). They use their 
estimates of the marginal costs of temporary layoffs in equations for permanent layoffs. Since the 
marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs are less than those of temporary layoffs, their tax cost 
coefficients for permanent layoffs are likely to have a downward bias.
4. We use the term "steady state" somewhat loosely here to describe simple constancy through 
time. Usually the term is used in truly dynamic systems in which at least one variable depends on 
its own value in a previous period. The benefit ratio method is essentially static but with lags, so 
that the endogenous variables depend only on the exogenous ones from the current and previous 
periods.
5. The technical reason why the tax surplus in the upswing is less than the tax shortfall in the 
downswing is that permanent layoffs qualify for UI benefits but there are no equivalent positive 




The experience-rating provisions of unemployment insurance (UI) 
financing are designed to internalize in part the costs of unemployment 
to the employer, who is the proximate cause of the job loss. These pro 
visions imply incentives to firms to reduce layoffs and, hence, unem 
ployment. Empirical research has shown that the incentives of 
experience rating may be sufficiently powerful to decrease layoffs sub 
stantially.
Summary
In this study, we have examined the nature and working of experi 
ence rating in the U.S. UI system, which, as previously discussed, is 
distinctive in being financed by an experience-rated payroll tax. Most 
previous research in this area has been concerned with temporary lay 
offs, which are responses to temporary fluctuation in the demand for 
labor and do not require any structural adjustment. For temporary lay 
offs, UI provides the important service of income support. Our primary 
emphasis in this book, by contrast, has been on the costs of permanent 
layoffs or job losses that involve the contraction of some sectors of the 
economy and the expansion of others. Specifically, we have asked the 
following three questions:
1. How important are permanent in relation to temporary layoffs?
2. Who should bear the costs of permanent layoffs?
3. How do current methods of experience rating internalize these 
costs to employers?
We have attempted to answer these questions in chapters 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively.
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Our basic findings are as follows. First, our empirical work suggests 
that permanent layoffs may constitute as much as 70 percent of all lay 
offs. Consequently, we believe that there is a valid rationale for exam 
ining experience rating and its effects on permanent layoffs.
Second, to obtain a socially optimal rate of structural adjustment, 
the agents who pay for the adjustment costs should also control the rate 
of adjustment. This rules out government financing from general reve 
nues. Further, payment by employers in the expanding sectors cannot 
be administered. Payment by dismissed workers may work well if 
wages are flexible and capital markets are perfect. Payment by employ 
ers in the contracting sectors is likely to work even if wages are inflex 
ible. Hence, there is a strong prima facie case for experience rating in 
the case of permanent layoffs.
Third, the charged benefits caused by permanent layoffs cannot be 
fully experience rated under either the reserve ratio or the benefit ratio 
method. This contrasts with the results obtained for temporary layoffs. 
When employers are on the sloped parts of the tax schedules, the 
(undiscounted) marginal tax costs of temporary layoffs are equal to 
charged benefits. The marginal tax costs of permanent layoffs, on the 
other hand, are less than the charged benefits. When employers are at 
the maximum and minimum tax rates, the marginal tax costs of tempo 
rary layoffs are zero and those of permanent layoffs are negative. In 
other words, at these tax rates employers receive a tax reward for per 
manent layoffs. As discussed in chapter 5, the difference between the 
effects of temporary and permanent layoffs is due to the declines in the 
tax base that occur only in the case of permanent layoffs.
Policy Implications
Our policy implications are based on the premise that an increased 
degree of interaalization of the costs of unemployment is desirable and 
that the present institutional and legal structure cannot be changed rad 
ically. Our policy findings are both "old" and "new."
Many other researchers have come to the conclusion that the maxi 
mum tax rate ought to be raised under either method of experience rat 
ing. Our research supports this view. As a result, our first policy
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recommendation is the following: Maximum tax rates should be raised 
substantially or even be eliminated. Minimum tax rates should be 
reduced or even be eliminated.
Under both methods of experience rating, there are substantial time 
lags between the payment of unemployment benefits and the resulting 
changes in taxes. In the absence of discounting, these lags undermine 
the working of experience rating. They result in interest-free loans to 
employers with high and rising charged benefits. We therefore recom 
mend that the administrative lag in the determination of the employer's 
tax rate be reduced to a minimum. Modern computing systems should 
allow the 1995 tax rate, for example, to be based on the reserve or ben 
efit ratio at the end of 1994.
From many points of view, the differences between the reserve ratio 
and the benefit ratio methods of experience rating are not substantial. 
However, we favor the reserve ratio method of experience rating 
because it appears to be more readily adaptable to relatively minor 
changes that would increase its efficiency in internalizing the costs of 
unemployment. The reserve ratio method is superior in this respect as 
it is based on the firm©s balance, which is a summary of previous 
charged benefits and tax payments. The benefit ratio method has no 
such summary.
Under the reserve ratio method, the decline in the employer©s bal 
ance measures the tax shortfall due to permanent layoffs when the 
employer©s long-run (steady state) position is on the slope of the tax 
schedule and any movements to the maximum or minimum rate are 
temporary. Thus, if the employer could be made to value fully the 
decline in the balance, full experience rating would occur. We present 
three policy recommendations designed to induce employers to place 
an appropriate value on their trust fund balance.
1. An employer's positive balance in the UI trust fund should be 
treated as pan of the employer's assets; a negative balance 
should be treated as a liability. The inclusion of positive and neg 
ative UI balances in the balance sheet would improve it as a 
reflection of employers© true financial status.
2. Upon cessation of business, due to bankruptcy, for example, an 
employer's positive balance should be refunded, and any nega 
tive balance should be payable in full. Business closures have
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been a troublesome issue for the UI system. When an employer 
goes out of business and lays off the entire work force, the tax 
able payroll falls to zero and, as a result, the (payroll) tax liabili 
ties disappear. However, the former employees qualify for and 
receive unemployment benefits. At present, the UI system cannot 
claim part of the employer©s remaining assets for the reimburse 
ment of the UI benefits. The UI system should be allowed to lay 
claim to the remaining assets to cover any negative balances. 
Similarly, any positive balance should be returned to the owners.
3. Interest should be paid on positive balances and charged on neg 
ative balances. The states© UI trust funds receive interest from the 
federal government, and it seems fair and proper that interest be 
paid by the trust funds to employers with positive balances. Fur 
ther, interest should be charged to employers with negative bal 
ances. Interest on negative balances, however, should be cash 
charges and not be added to negative balances. Positive interest 
payments should be added to the positive balance.
Interest payments on positive and negative balances are important 
for at least two reasons. They give an inducement to employers, first, to 
avoid negative balances, and second, to build up positive ones. Typi 
cally, charged benefits occur now, and the corresponding taxes occur 
several years afterwards. At present, the system does not account for 
this difference by discounting future tax liabilities. A simple way of 
resolving the discounting problem under the reserve ratio method of 
experience rating is to pay (charge) interest on positive (negative) bal 
ances. No such simple method of dealing with the discounting problem 
seems to exist under the benefit ratio method.
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